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PRIVACY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY*
SALLY BROWN RICHARDSON**
Technological advances are transforming the issue of intraspousal privacy. Increasingly, spying spouses are covertly
obtaining emails and text messages, while spied-on spouses are
filing lawsuits alleging intrusion upon their seclusion. The
majority of courts that have examined the issue of intra-spousal
privacy have held that spouses are no different than other
individuals; spouses do not forfeit through marriage their
expectation of privacy, even from one another.
Determining the scope of a spouse’s right of privacy is uniquely
difficult in the nine community property jurisdictions within the
United States. The default rule in these states is that property
created or acquired during marriage is classified as community
property, and thus jointly owned by both spouses. Because two
people have an ownership interest in community property,
managerial rules must be written to determine which spouse
controls the property. The default management rule generally
allows either spouse to have the authority to manage community
property, regardless of which spouse acquires or uses the
property. Because of these ownership and managerial rules, it is
unclear what, if any, rights of privacy spouses have vis-à-vis one
another with regards to community property. This ambiguity is
an increasingly vexing problem, particularly given the
exponential increase in the creation of property that a spouse
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may wish to keep private—such as email and text messages—as
well as the constant development of technology that makes these
forms of property easier and more accessible.
This Article dissects the intersection of community property and
privacy. In doing so, this Article finds that the privacy rights of
spouses in community property jurisdictions are, at best,
uncertain. History, modern jurisprudence, and policy
considerations lead to the normative position taken herein: that
spouses in community property states should have an
unambiguous right of privacy from one another, even with
regards to property jointly owned. This Article provides a series
of alternative strategies that courts and legislatures may pursue to
ensure that such a right is fully protected, including possible
modifications to current community property ownership or
management rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Warren and Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy in
1890 —and arguably before that time—the common law has
recognized a person’s right to a reasonable expectation of privacy
from other private, non-governmental individuals.2 In this vein, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts precludes intrusions upon the solitude
or seclusion of an individual or his private affairs or concerns that
would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”3 While the right
of privacy remains a cornerstone of tort law, the precise contours of
what constitutes a highly offensive intrusion remain elusive,
particularly in situations where property is jointly held. When two
individuals have a concurrent property interest in the same thing, the
law is unclear as to what rights of privacy the individuals have vis-àvis one another with regards to the jointly held property.4
The question of privacy between joint owners is at its greatest
level of complexity in its most intimate context: property jointly
owned by spouses. While spouses in all fifty states can and do acquire
property together, intra-spousal privacy is of particular concern in the
nine community property jurisdictions5 where, by default, all property
spouses create or acquire while married is jointly owned as
community property.6
1

1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
2. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1887, 1891 (2010); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 919, 930–35 (2005).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
4. To be clear from the outset, the question raised here is not what constitutional
rights of privacy joint owners have from one another. The question is what common law
and statutory rights of privacy joint owners have from one another.
5. The nine community property jurisdictions are Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See William Perez,
Community Property Laws by States, BALANCE (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www
.thebalance.com/community-property-states-3193432 [https://perma.cc/B67X-2EEP].
6. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.)
(defining community property as property acquired during marriage); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 760 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. laws) (same); IDAHO CODE § 32-906
(LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (Westlaw through 2016
2d Extraordinary Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (West, Westlaw through 2015
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What rights of privacy spouses have in community property
remains an unanswered and increasingly vexing question.
Technological advances are transforming the issue of intra-spousal
privacy, thus increasing the need to determine the extent of spouses’
privacy rights in community property jurisdictions. Today, individuals
engage in more transactions and communications online, thereby
increasing the “digital lipstick [left] on the collar.”7 For more than a
decade, spy software has been available for less than $100 and can be
easily installed without making anyone the wiser.8 Case law in noncommunity property states, or separate property jurisdictions, is
replete with stories of spouses secretly videotaping one another or
hacking into the other’s email accounts.9
Numerous courts in separate property jurisdictions that have
thus far examined the issue of intra-spousal privacy have held that
spouses are no different than other individuals—spouses do not
“forfeit through marriage [their] expectation of privacy.”10 Courts
typically analyze intra-spousal privacy under the modern privacy tort
of intrusion upon seclusion.11 Under this analysis, the question is
whether the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.12 The fact that spouses share a home may, in some instances,
Legis. Sess. and 2016 Spec. Sess.); In re Estate of Patton, 494 P.2d 238, 242 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1972) (noting that each spouse has a one-half interest in community property); J.
Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 100 (1993).
The discussion herein focuses on community property jurisdictions because the
default rule in these jurisdictions is that, barring legislation to the contrary, all property
acquired during marriage is jointly owned from the moment of its acquisition. E.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (Westlaw). The same issues of privacy arise for property jointly
owned by spouses in non-community property jurisdictions. Future projects will examine
more broadly the issues of privacy and jointly owned property. The quantity of jointly
owned property automatically created in community property regimes makes privacy and
community property a particularly interesting starting point.
7. Laura M. Holson, Text Messages: Digital Lipstick on the Collar, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/09text.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3MMtNMT7].
8. Joyce Crane, Is It Healthy To Be Stealthy? Using Software to Spy, BOS. GLOBE,
Apr. 9, 2001, at C2.
9. E.g., In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Iowa 2008) (spouse secretly
videotaping other spouse); People v. Walker, 813 N.W.2d 750, 751 (Mich. 2012) (mem.)
(spouse reading other spouse’s emails without authorization); State v. Hormann, 805
N.W.2d 883, 886–87 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (spouse monitoring whereabouts of other
spouse’s vehicle without other spouse’s knowledge); see also infra Part II.
10. Tigges, 758 N.W.2d at 828 (citing Miller v. Brooks, 123 N.C. App. 20, 472 S.E.2d
350 (1996); Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)).
11. See infra Section II.A.1.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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suggest that an actionable intrusion did not occur, but this is purely a
factual determination in what is, and is not, a highly offensive
intrusion within an intimate living arrangement.13 The legal rule is
generally the same for spouses as it is for non-spouses—individuals,
regardless of whether they are married, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from other parties.14
Determining the scope of spouses’ rights of privacy is uniquely
difficult in community property jurisdictions. In these states, all
property created or acquired during the marriage is jointly owned by
the spouses from the moment the property is created or acquired.15
For example, if a spouse purchases a diary while married, the diary is
classified as community property from the time of its purchase,
regardless of whether only one spouse uses and has access to it.
Ownership rules in community property jurisdictions do not
distinguish between which spouse purchases the diary or intends to
write in the diary.
Spouses may lose at least some, and perhaps all, of their rights of
privacy with regard to community property for two reasons. First,
individuals who jointly own property traditionally have equal rights of

13. E.g., Miller v. Brooks, 123 N.C. App. 20, 27, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (1996); see Laura
W. Morgan & Lewis B. Reich, The Individual’s Right of Privacy in a Marriage, 23 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. L. 111, 125–27 (2010).
14. Tigges, 758 N.W.2d at 828; Walker, 813 N.W.2d at 751; Miller, 123 N.C. App. at 27,
472 S.E.2d at 355.
15. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.) (“All
property acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage is the property of the
husband and wife . . . .”). As discussed in depth herein, there are exceptions to the rule that
property acquired during marriage is community property. See infra Section III.A.1.
Furthermore, as I have previously argued, it is possible (though improbable) that some
forms of community property that spouses might wish to keep private, such as emails or
text messages, could escape the classification of community property under certain
scenarios, such as if it is found to be a gift to one spouse or in some jurisdictions if it is
considered the profit of a separate property email account. See Sally Brown Richardson,
Classifying Virtual Property in Community Property Regimes: Are My Facebook Friends
Considered Earnings, Profits, Increases in Value, or Goodwill?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 717, 758–
70 (2011) [hereinafter Richardson, Classifying Virtual Property].
Even in that unlikely situation, and despite the numerous exceptions to the
classification of property as community, community property jurisdictions create broader
presumptions that property possessed or owned while married is community property,
thereby making it more difficult to have property classified as separate property. See, e.g.,
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2340 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary Sess.); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.003(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.) (stating that property
possessed during marriage is presumed to be community property); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 766.31 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392) (stating that all property is presumed to be
community property).
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use of that property.16 Equal rights of use usually preclude the joint
owners from excluding one another from the jointly owned
property.17 Without an ability to exclude, it is unclear the extent to
which a joint owner, like a spouse in a community property regime,
can maintain a right of privacy. For example, with regards to a
community property diary, if the spouse who writes in the diary has
no ability to exclude the non-authoring spouse from the diary, it is
uncertain what rights of privacy, if any, the authoring spouse actually
has in the diary.
Second, the default rule in community property regimes is that
community property is subject to equal management.18 Equal
management means that either spouse can make decisions regarding
the property, such as decisions to sell, encumber, or lease the
property, without needing the consent of the other spouse.19 If the
diary is subject to equal management—which it likely would be—
either the authoring or non-authoring spouse has the authority to sell
the diary.20 It remains an open question whether one spouse can
retain a right of privacy in a piece of community property that either
spouse could, at any time, lawfully alienate.21 In other words, if equal
management grants both spouses the greater rights to sell, encumber,
or lease community property, should not both spouses have lesser

16. See, e.g., McCormick v. McCormick, 220 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
Snodgrass v. Baumgart, 974 P.2d 604, 607 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); Seaboard Air Line R. Co.
v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 237 N.C. 88, 95, 74 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1953).
17. See, e.g., Skalla v. Canepari, 430 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Ark. 2013); Galasso v. Del
Guercio, 276 A.2d 186, 189 (N.J. 1971).
18. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(B) (Westlaw) (establishing that
spouses have equal management over community property); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100
(Westlaw); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary Sess.)
(providing for equal management unless otherwise provided by law).
19. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2346 (Westlaw); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-14 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
20. See Elizabeth De Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and
Control Provisions of Community Property Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 249 (1995)
(discussing equal management schemes).
21. There are instances under community property law when one spouse may have
sole managerial authority over a particular piece of community property, thereby giving
the managing spouse the sole right to make decisions with regards to that property. See,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d) (Westlaw); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2351 (Westlaw);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.). It is not clear,
however, that having sole managerial authority establishes a right of privacy for the
managing spouse given that the non-managing spouse still retains an ownership interest in
the property. See infra Section III.B.2.
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rights in that property, such as the rights to read and use the
property?
While the nature of community property calls into question the
extent to which spouses retain a right of privacy from one another,
there is a strong public policy in favor of intra-spousal privacy.22 The
majority of states—including the nine community property
jurisdictions—recognize intrusion upon seclusion as a tort.23 Statutes
in all fifty states make modern invasions of privacy, such as
eavesdropping and wiretapping, unlawful.24 Non-community property
jurisdictions have almost universally held that spouses retain their
common law and statutorily provided rights of privacy vis-à-vis one
another after entering marriage.25 If spouses living under community
property regimes receive different—and ultimately fewer—rights of
privacy, this strong public policy in favor of individual privacy would
diminish that privacy interest for married individuals. Despite public
policy, it remains unclear whether spouses in community property
jurisdictions have a right of privacy from one another in their
community property. Courts have not yet examined this intersection
of privacy and community property law, and little scholarship has
been written on the topic.26
22. E.g., Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 155–56 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). The right
of privacy discussed here is limited to the right of privacy from other private parties.
23. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392);
Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 784–85 (Ariz. 1989) (noting that
Arizona imposes a stricter standard for the intrusion tort when the damages alleged are
emotional); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999); Hoskins v. Howard,
971 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Idaho 1998); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386,
1388 (La. 1979); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Hecht, 940 P.2d
134, 138 (Nev. 1997); PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995),
overruled on other grounds, Moore v. Sun Publ’g Corp., 881 P.2d 735, 743 (N.M. Ct. App.
1994), cert. denied, 882 P.2d 21 (N.M. 1994); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 524
(Tex. 1993); Mark v. King Broad. Co., 618 P.2d 512, 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
24. See sources cited infra notes 157, 164 (listing all state statutes making
eavesdropping, wiretapping, and unauthorized computer access unlawful). As discussed
more fully herein, the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act also prohibits the
unauthorized interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. See infra Section
II.B.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See Richardson, Classifying Virtual Property, supra note 15, at 758–70; Sally
Brown Richardson, How Community Property Jurisdictions Can Avoid Being Lost in
Cyberspace, 72 LA. L. REV. 89, 90 (2011) [hereinafter Richardson, How Community
Property Jurisdictions]. See generally Lillian Marie Grappe, Comment, “Yours, Mine, or
Ours?”: Ownership and Management of Electronic Communications in Community
Property Regimes, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 161 (2015) (exploring ownership
regimes within community property jurisdictions).

95 N.C. L. REV. 729 (2017)

736

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

As discussed herein, history, modern jurisprudence, and policy
considerations lead to the normative position that spouses in
community property states should have an unambiguous right of
privacy from one another, even with regards to property they jointly
own.27 If spouses are to retain meaningful rights of privacy, then
jurisdictions must determine how two spouses can have ownership
and managerial rights in community property when one spouse has a
right of privacy in that community property from the other spouse. In
other words, states that want to ensure spouses have a right of privacy
must address the fundamental question of how community property
law can coexist with intra-spousal privacy.
This Article asserts that intra-spousal rights of privacy can be
clearly established within community property regimes by altering
community property ownership or management rules. In doing so,
this Article provides a series of alternative strategies that courts and
legislatures may pursue. These possible solutions include alterations
to current community property ownership rules based on Neil
Richards’s theory of intellectual privacy, as well as changes to
community property management law that make spouses’ privacy
rights akin to the rights of privacy provided under the Fourth
Amendment and the Freedom of Information Act.28
To reach this end, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I
discusses the evolution of marriage, demonstrating how the law has
developed from viewing spouses as one person to seeing spouses as
two, distinct individuals. This evolving construction has thereby
allowed courts to recognize a spouse’s right of privacy from her
spouse. Part II details the right of privacy a person generally has from
other non-governmental individuals and examines how this right is
applied to the spousal relationship in separate property jurisdictions.
Part III explains how community property ownership and
management law creates a lack of clarity regarding intra-spousal
privacy. Part IV asserts that spouses in community property states
should retain a right of privacy with regards to their community
property and proposes a series of possible revisions to state
community property law that seek to ensure that such personal
privacy interests are protected.

27. See infra Section IV.A.
28. See infra Section IV.B.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
Since the beginning of civilization, individuals have exchanged
vows of marriage, and society has valued the marriage institution.29
The import placed on marriage has impacted laws regulating the
rights of spouses as a unit, as well as the rights of spouses as
individuals. Over time, as perspectives on marriage and the
individuality of spouses have changed, the rights of spouses vis-à-vis
one another have similarly transformed. This transformation in the
rights of spouses has allowed courts to find that spouses have a right
of privacy from one another.
A. A Historic Union on Which Society Was Built
In describing the value of the city-state, Aristotle wrote,
“Since . . . the legislator should see to it from the start that the bodies
of children being reared develop in the best possible way, he must
first supervise the union of the sexes . . . .”30 Aristotle’s belief that
procreation was good and necessary for the future of the state served
as the basis for his conclusion that the state should be in the business
of “determin[ing] what sorts of people should have marital relations
with one another, and when.”31
Considering marriage as a valuable union was by no means a
unique view during the early development of civilization. Cicero
shared Aristotle’s view that marriage was important to the foundation
of government.32 For Cicero, the foundation of civil government was
built on the “bond of union[s] of the human race in general,” and “the
first bond of union [was] that between husband and wife.”33
Given the early beliefs in the importance of marriage for the
formation of government, it is of little surprise that America’s
founding fathers similarly valued the marriage union.34 John Adams

29. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008) (discussing the tradition of
marriage).
30. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. VII, ll. 1334b29–32, at 220 (C.D.C. Reeve trans.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1998) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
31. Id.
32. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. I, xvii, at 56–57 (T.E. Page, E. Capps
& W.H.D. Rouse eds., Walter Miller trans., Harv. Univ. Press 1913) (c. 44 B.C.E.).
33. Id.
34. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 695 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Penguin Putnam, Inc. 2004) (1835) (referring to marriage as “the
bonds of matrimony” and emphasizing the importance of the wife’s role and domestic
interests to the unique economic and religious principles of the United States).
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noted that the family was “[t]he foundation[] of national morality.”35
Thomas Jefferson similarly wrote, “Harmony in the marriage state is
the very first object to be aimed at.”36 Benjamin Franklin, responding
in the Pennsylvania Packet to a reader’s inquiry on whether the
reader was wise to enter into an early marriage, said,
I am glad you are married, and congratulate you cordially upon
it. You are now more in the way of becoming a useful citizen;
and you have escap’d the unnatural State of Celibacy for Life,
the Fate of many here who never intended it, but who, having
too long postpon’d the Change of their Condition, find at
length that ‘tis too late to think of it, and So live all their Lives
in a Situation that greatly lessens a Man’s Value . . . .37
From its inception, the United States Supreme Court indicated a
similar view on the importance of marriage. In deciding whether
religious freedom could be used as a defense against prosecution for
polygamy, the Court in Reynolds v. United States38 offered an early
commentary on the value of marriage.39 The Court held that it was
“impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most
important feature of social life. Marriage, while from its very nature a
sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil
contract, and usually regulated by law.”40 By placing marriage above
all else, the Court reflected on the view of marriage as a union upon
which “society may be said to be built.”41

35. JOHN ADAMS, PASSY & PARIS, in 4 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN
ADAMS 111, 123 (L.H. Butterfield, Leonard C. Faber & Wendell D. Garrett eds., 1962).
36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. President-Elect, to Mary Jefferson Eppes
(Jan. 7, 1798), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-30-02-0008. [http://
perma.cc/RDR8-UM2M].
37. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to John Alleyne (Aug. 9, 1768), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-15-02-0101 [http://perma.cc/P34U-S9NA].
38. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
39. Id. at 165.
40. Id.
41. Id. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343–44 (1890); see also Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (describing marriage as “creating the most important relation in life,
as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other
institution”); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (describing marriage as “the sure
foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political
improvement”).
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An Ebb and Flow of Intra-Spousal Rights

The Court’s axiomatic acceptance of marriage as the bedrock of
society coupled well with the understanding in the 1700s and 1800s
that marriage created one person, such that individuality—specifically
that of the woman—ended upon the beginning of wedded life.42 As
Blackstone famously wrote,
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is
therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert . . . is said to be
covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her
husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture.43
Blackstone’s view heavily influenced American courts.44 The
implications of molding the wife’s person into that of her husband’s
person were vast, touching nearly every facet of private law. Because
a wife had no separate personality, she was unable to own property
during marriage;45 all property was considered owned by the
42. See Pinkas v. Fiveash, 126 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); NORMA
BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17 (1982); EDWARD WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY
OF HUMAN MARRIAGE 41 (1903) (citing R. H. CODRINGTON, THE MELANESIANS:
STUDIES IN THEIR ANTHROPOLOGY AND FOLK-LORE 34 (1891)); Karen S. Nelson,
Comment, Domestic Tranquility and the Right to Privacy: Is There a Right to Privacy
Within the Family?, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 121, 127 (1976). The notion that spouses become one
upon marriage has biblical roots: “Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother,
and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.” Genesis 2:24 (King James). See
BASCH, supra, at 27 (discussing the religious and empirical roots for the view that spouses
became one person upon marriage). See generally MARY DALY, THE CHURCH AND THE
SECOND SEX (1985) (discussing the historical role of the church in maintaining an
inequality between the sexes).
43. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441. See Ingalls v. Campbell, 24 P.
904, 906 (Or. 1889) (“At common law, marriage merged the existence of the wife into that
of the husband, and constituted them one person in the law.”); JOAN HOFF, LAW,
GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 119 (Kathleen Barry ed.,
1991) (noting that the “legal fiction [of coverture] was at the heart of Blackstone’s famous
common-law dictum about the ‘civil death’ of married women”).
44. Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 163, 169 (Conn. 1805); Long v. Kinney, 49 Ind. 235, 238
(1874); Wilder v. Brooks, 10 Minn. 50, 54 (1865); Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church,
17 Johns. 548, 583 (N.Y. 1820).
45. See Michael M. Sheehan, The Influence of Canon Law on the Property Rights of
Married Women in England, in MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE:
COLLECTED STUDIES 16, 20 (James K. Farge ed., 1996). In Greek times, the restriction on
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husband.46 Even a desiring husband could not “grant anything to his
wife, or enter into covenant with her: for the grant would be to
suppose her separate existence; and to covenant with her, would be
only to covenant with himself.”47
Beyond being unable to own property, wives were also unable to
administer the property attributed to their husbands.48 A married
woman was incapable of entering into contracts regarding property.49
She could not sell, encumber, or lease property, and usually this
limitation even included any property the wife brought with her into
the marriage.50 Instead, the one legal personality of the marriage,
namely the husband, had sole authority over all property.51
Arguably even more egregious than a wife’s inability to hold
property rights, the one-person view of marriage led to the conclusion
that husbands and wives were unable to commit crimes or torts
against one another.52 A husband could not, for example, rape his
wife, for doing so would be merely a crime against himself.53
owning property was not limited to married women; all women—regardless of marital
status—were unable to own property. W. K. LACEY, THE FAMILY IN CLASSICAL GREECE
24 (H. H. Scullard ed., 1968).
46. Sheehan, supra note 45, at 20.
47. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441. See Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657,
663 (1852); Long v. Kinney, 49 Ind. 235, 238 (1874); Bennett v. Bennett, 23 N.E. 17, 19
(N.Y. 1889); People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 408 (N.Y. 1842).
48. Sheehan, supra note 45, at 20.
49. See, e.g., Uhl v. Oakdale Auto Co., 170 A.2d 914, 915 (Me. 1961); Citizens
Commercial & Sav. Bank v. Raleigh, 406 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Brazell
v. Tschirhart, 438 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).
50. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 245 S.W. 509, 511 (Ky. 1922); Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y.
299, 303 (N.Y. 1882) (citing Ridout v. Earl of Plymouth (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 465 (HL)).
51. E.g., Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106, 108–10 (1872). The Michigan Supreme Court
held that Michigan’s liberalizing statute allowing for separate property ownership by the
wife meant that a wife could contract with regard to her property, but that she did not
have a general right to the property; that right remained with her husband. Id. Therefore,
the court held that the husband was not guilty of arson for burning down the dwelling
house owned by the wife. Id. at 111.
52. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.04 (West, Westlaw through File 123 of
2015–2016 131st Gen. Assemb.) (“Neither [husband nor wife] can be excluded from the
other’s dwelling, except upon a decree or order of injunction made by a court of
competent jurisdiction.”). Several Ohio courts interpreted this provision such that it was
impossible for a husband or wife to commit burglary or trespass against the other. See
State v. Middleton, 619 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); State v. Herder, 415
N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). Eventually, though, Ohio courts became
concerned with this line of precedent for the purposes of domestic violence cases, and the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute is inapplicable to criminal cases. See State v.
O’Neal, 721 N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ohio 2000); State v. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ohio 1999).
53. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (citing the marital
exception statute for criminal sexual assault and holding that the state’s interest in family
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In the 1830s, the tide began to change for intra-spousal rights as
states began discussing—and in some cases passing—statutes that
relieved women of many of their legal handicaps.54 In 1835, Arkansas
passed the first statute that acknowledged women’s property as
separate from that of her husband, though the statute merely
exempted the wife’s property from the debts of her husband.55
Mississippi became the first state to pass a married women’s property
act in 1839, when the state legislature passed a statute allowing a wife
to possess property “in her own name, and as of her own property.”56
Maryland soon followed in Mississippi’s footsteps.57 In 1848, after
hosting the influential Seneca Falls convention, New York passed a
similar statute that was used as a model for other states.58
States’ passage of married women’s property acts “effectively
destroyed the ‘one person concept’ ” that previously existed.59 With
the destruction of the old common law fiction that husbands and
wives were one person, courts began to adopt the notion that spouses
were separate individuals.60 As one Kansas court stated in 1888,
In this state a husband and wife are two independent persons,
and the husband has no more immediate interest or control
over the property of the wife than any other person. Our system
of marriage literally implies the equality of the husband and
wife; the integrity and individuality of each; the mutual

harmony afforded a rational basis for the marital rape exemption); Commonwealth v.
Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (noting that, historically, marriage was
a defense to rape); see also Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122–25 (1996) (footnotes omitted)
(discussing the legal right husbands had over their wives, including rights to physically
punish).
54. BASCH, supra note 42, at 136–38; HOFF, supra note 43, at 127.
55. An Act to Secure the Property of Females, 1835 Ark. Acts 34, 34–35 (“[T]he
property, both real and personal, possessed by any woman . . . shall not be subject to the
payment of the debts or damages, contracted or incurred by the husband at any time
before marriage.”); ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS
OF MARRIED WOMEN: 1800–1861, at 159 (1987).
56. An Act for the Protection and Preservation of the Rights and Property of Married
Women, ch. 26, § 1, 1839 Miss. Laws 920, 920–21.
57. An Act to Regulate Conjugal Rights as They Regard Property, ch. 293, 1842 Md.
Laws 254, 254–55.
58. An Act for the More Effectual Protection of the Property of Married Women,
1848 N.Y. Laws 307. See HOFF, supra note 43, at 127–28.
59. Haumschild v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814, 817 (Wis. 1959).
60. E.g., Sparks v. Roberts, 65 Ga. 571, 574 (1880); Harrington v. Lowe, 84 P. 570, 578
(Kan. 1906); Campbell Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Boulevard Enters., Inc., 360 S.W.2d 744, 745
(Ky. 1962); Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 861 (Pa. 1981).
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obligation in which love and duty find no bondage; the division
of labor; and the multiplication and sharing of happiness.61
Such attitudes were the foundations not only for women’s ownership
of property but also for women entering into separate contracts,62
allowing tort suits between spouses,63 and other activities that
highlighted that spouses were separate individuals.64
C.

Continuing Value Placed on the Marriage Union

Though by the early 1900s spouses were generally viewed as
separate individuals, the marriage union remains highly protected by
courts today. Cases discussing the marital evidentiary protections
highlight the pedestal on which courts have placed the marriage
relationship.65 The marital privilege that prohibits spouses from
testifying against one another was historically grounded on the
Blackstonian idea that husbands and wives were one person and that
an accused individual could not be forced to testify against his own
interest.66 Thus, “what was inadmissible from the lips of the
defendant-husband was also inadmissible from his wife.”67 Yet even
after the Supreme Court abolished the notion that spouses became
one individual upon marriage,68 jurisdictions retained the marital
privilege on the grounds that allowing adverse spousal testimony
would likely “destroy” marriages.69

61. Baker v. Stewart, 19 P. 904, 912 (Kan. 1888).
62. Bruce v. Bruce, 11 So. 197, 197–98 (Ala. 1892); Elliot v. Atkinson, 90 N.E. 779, 780
(Ind. Ct. App. 1910); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266, 268 (S.D. 1941).
63. Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95, 97 (Alaska 1963); Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889, 890
(Conn. 1914); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 140 P. 1022, 1023–24 (Okla. 1914). See generally Carl
Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359 (1989) (recounting the
history of interspousal tort immunity).
64. E.g., Thaler v. Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331, 336–37 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (allowing either
spouse to collect alimony), rev’d, 396 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1977) (mem.).
65. See Pamela A. Haun, The Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First Century, 32 U.
MEM. L. REV. 137, 139–44 (2001) (discussing the historical development of the marital
privilege in state and federal courts).
66. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 52.
69. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958). The adverse testimonial
privilege was limited by the Court in Trammel. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53. In Trammel, the
Court narrowed the scope of the adverse testimonial privilege by allowing it to be invoked
only by the witness-spouse, under the theory that if the witness-spouse opted to not invoke
the privilege, the marriage was in such a state of “disrepair” that the spousal rationale
behind the rule no longer applied. Id.
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In 1934, the Court expanded the evidentiary protections afforded
to spouses by creating the marital communications privilege.70 In
explaining why spousal communications should be granted immunity,
the Court offered that “[t]he basis of the immunity given to
communications between husband and wife is the protection of
marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of
the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the
administration of justice which the privilege entails.”71
The Court similarly expounded on the importance of marriage in
the landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut.72 In Griswold, the
Supreme Court questioned the constitutionality of a Connecticut
statute that made it illegal for any person to use contraception and for
any person who “assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands
another” to use contraception.73 Two individuals—one a physician
and professor at Yale Medical School, one the executive director for
Planned Parenthood—gave information to married couples regarding
the use of contraception and were arrested and fined $100 under the
accessory law.74
In determining whether the Connecticut statute violated the
constitutional rights of married persons, the Court held that the
marriage union was protected by a constitutional right to privacy.75
The Court asked, “Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.”76 In describing the
constitutional right of privacy afforded to the marriage union, the
Court went on to say,
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—
older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together that for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
70. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (holding that “communications
between the spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to have been intended to be
confidential, and hence they are privileged”).
71. Id.
72. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73. Id. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 485. The Griswold Court held the appellants had standing to raise the
constitutional rights of married persons. Id. at 481.
76. Id. at 485–86.
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harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social project. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.77
Since Griswold, courts have similarly reiterated the importance
of the marriage union. In holding that prohibitions against interracial
marriage were unconstitutional, the Court in Loving v. Virginia78
stated that marriage is “fundamental to our very existence and
survival.”79 The Court subsequently struck down a Wisconsin statute
that required individuals who owed child support to minor children
not in the individual’s custody to get court permission before being
allowed to marry in Zablocki v. Redhail,80 noting that marriage “is the
foundation of the family in our society.”81
More recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges,82 the Court recognized a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage under both the due process
clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution.83 The majority opinion began with a statement
regarding the importance of marriage: “From their beginning to their
most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent
importance of marriage.”84 Moving beyond the historical importance
of marriage, the Obergefell Court said, like courts before it, that
marriage was significant, a “basic human need[],” and even “essential
to our most profound hopes and aspirations.”85 Marriage, as it has
been since before the birth of the nation, remains an important and
valued institution.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY AND MARRIAGE
Just as marriage is, in the eyes of the law, a valued institution,
spouses’ rights of privacy are highly valued. Placing a high import on
the rights of privacy of spouses may not be at first intuitive; in fact,
the value that courts, like the one in Obergefell, continue to place on
marriage could lead to the conclusion that spouses have no right of
privacy within a union to one another. Allowing spouses to keep
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 486.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12.
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Id. at 386.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Id. at 2604.
Id. at 2593.
Id. at 2594.
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aspects of their lives private and, in effect, hidden from each other
might be viewed as upsetting the institution of marriage. To an extent,
marital evidentiary privileges help facilitate open communications
between spouses, and the law views open communication between
spouses as a good worth protecting, regardless of its cost to the
administration of justice.86 Allowing spouses to keep things private
from one another may be perceived as undermining the good society
sees in having open communications between spouses.
Despite the protections the marital unit continues to receive, in
the context of intra-spousal privacy, protecting the individuality of
spouses tends to trump protecting the marital unit. As the view of
spouses has shifted from perceiving married persons as a single unit to
viewing married persons as separate individuals, the majority of
courts have not hesitated to grant intra-spousal privacy rights, be it
under tort law or by statute.87
A. Common Law Right of Privacy
Under tort law, a spouse’s right of privacy is generally examined
under the privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion. This privacy tort,
which finds its origins with Warren and Brandeis, has been applied
many times in the spousal context.
When Warren and Brandeis authored The Right of Privacy, they
described a common law right of privacy that other American jurists
were just beginning to recognize.88 Warren and Brandeis believed that
the need to create a right of privacy stemmed from the fact that the
law had no existing principle to protect personal items such as
appearance, writings, and relations, but technology and business
practices had advanced such that these personal items were easily

86. However, not all scholars view the marital privilege as a good worth protecting.
Jeremy Bentham, for example, wrote that the marital privilege “secures, to every man,
one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for every imaginable crime.” 5
JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 338 (London, Hunt & Clarke
1827). See David Medine, The Adverse Testimonial Privilege: Time to Dispose of a
“Sentimental Relic”, 67 OR. L. REV. 519, 544–53 (1988) (arguing that marital privilege is no
longer beneficial because it is prejudicial to the prosecution and does not serve its goals of
protecting marital harmony).
87. Courts have also recognized intra-spousal rights of privacy under criminal law.
E.g., State v. Perez, 779 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding a husband’s
conviction for interference with privacy for videotaping his wife “while she was alone and
undressed in their bathroom without her knowledge or consent”).
88. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. See Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at
1891.
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made public.89 The authors’ particular concern was directed towards
the press overstepping “the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency[,]” though the framework they developed has been applied
to private individuals other than the press.90
In establishing the foundation for how personal privacy should
be legally protected, Warren and Brandeis acknowledged that
determining an exact line for what violated an individual’s right of
privacy was a difficult task; the particular facts of the situation must
be taken into account.91 Despite this difficulty, Warren and Brandeis
created general rules for considering whether a violation of privacy
had occurred.92 These rules stated, among other things, that the right
of privacy did not prohibit the publication of matters of public
interest, that consent defeated an individual’s privacy, that malice on
the part of the publisher was not required, and that truth was not a
defense.93
Seventy years later, William Prosser observed how courts had
interpreted the work of Warren and Brandeis.94 Prosser organized
courts’ privacy findings into four distinct wrongs: (1) the
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, (2) the
appropriation of another’s name or likeness, (3) the unreasonable
publication of another’s private life, and (4) the publication of
material that unreasonably places another in a false light.95 These four
forms of invading an individual’s right of privacy were then included
by Prosser, as the chief reporter, in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.96 The four privacy torts imagined by Prosser were adopted by
courts and remain accepted in law today.97

89. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213. According to Warren and Brandeis,
“Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demand[] legal recognition.” Id. at 196.
90. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196; see also Pavesich v. N. Eng. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E. 68, 80–81 (Ga. 1905); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383–89
(1960).
91. Id. at 214.
92. Id. at 214–18.
93. Id.
94. William L. Prosser, supra note 90, at 384–88.
95. Id. at 389.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Paul M.
Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German Right of Personality:
Are Four Privacy Torts Better Than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1925, 1939
(2010).
97. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 895.50 (1977); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 96, at 1937–42.
For a collection of cases generally adopting and applying the privacy torts, see generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A.
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1. The Privacy Tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion
While the other three privacy torts require the publication of
information, the intrusion tort does not.98 Accordingly, claims
concerning intra-spousal privacy tend to center on the intrusion tort
because the spying spouse often does not publish the information
discovered;99 the intrusion itself is what causes the harm to the spiedon spouse.100
In writing about the privacy tort of intrusion, Prosser established
that the intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person and
it must be an intrusion into something—whether a part of his person
or his property—that was entitled to be private.101 In describing what
it means to intrude on another’s seclusion, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts says that such an intrusion may be performed
by the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without
mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private
affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars
or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of
investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by
opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his
wallet, examining his private bank account, or compelling him
by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his personal
documents.102
Following Prosser’s description, courts consider an intrusion on
one’s seclusion as a violation of the right of privacy if that intrusion
would be considered highly offensive by a reasonable person.103
Accordingly, the elements most courts analyze in considering an
intrusion claim are: (1) whether there was an intrusion, (2) whether
the intrusion was highly offensive, and (3) whether the intrusion was

98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. a.
99. A spouse certainly could publish the private information discovered. In the recent
revenge pornography cases that made national headlines, some of the cases involved
husbands who posted private photos of their wives. See, e.g., Rachel Cromidas, Chicago
Lawsuit Filed as Legislators Debate Revenge Porn, REDEYE (Mar. 12, 2014), http://articles
.redeyechicago.com/2014-03-11/news/48127548_1_hunter-moore-mary-anne-franks-legislators
[https://perma.cc/L4QR-CTHP]. However, in most intra-spousal privacy claims,
publication of the private information obtained does not occur.
100. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Ameritech Ill., 768 N.E.2d 303, 310 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002); see
also, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 995.50(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392).
101. Prosser, supra note 90, at 391.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b.
103. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 995.50(2)(a) (Westlaw) (“Intrusion upon the privacy of
another of a nature highly offensive to a reasonable person . . . .”).
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in some matter in which the individual had a legitimate expectation of
privacy.104 Using this standard, courts have held that placing a
listening or videotaping device in an individual’s bedroom without his
consent,105 the unauthorized opening of another’s mail,106 taking
unauthorized photographs of an individual at home through her
windows,107 and other similar acts, are all intrusions highly offensive
to a reasonable person. However, courts have determined that
sending unsolicited mailings108 or taking photographs of an individual
while outside in a place where neighbors could see her109 are not, to a
reasonable person, highly offensive intrusions.
2. Applying the Intrusion Tort to Spouses
Some state courts have interpreted the right to privacy from
highly offensive intrusions as protecting spouses’ rights of privacy visà-vis one another.110 In determining whether one spouse has intruded
on the rights of privacy of the other, courts apply the same legal
analysis used in non-spousal cases—a spouse commits an intrusion
upon seclusion if he intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude of his spouse or his spouse’s private affairs or concerns, and
that intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.111
For example, in Miller v. Brooks,112 the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina held that a wife engaged in a highly offensive
intrusion upon her husband’s seclusion when the wife hired a private
investigator to place a surveillance camera in the ceiling of her
estranged husband’s bedroom.113 Upon learning that his wife had the
surveillance camera installed, the husband successfully sought a
declaratory judgment and damages for the invasion of his privacy
under the theory that his wife and the private detectives engaged in a
104. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 875–76
(8th Cir. 2000); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 74 S.W.3d 634, 644 (Ark. 2002); Swarthout v.
Mut. Serv. Life Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741, 745–46 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Mauri v. Smith,
929 P.2d 307, 310 (Or. 1996).
105. Hamberger v. Easteman, 206 A.2d 239, 241–42 (N.H. 1964) (listening device);
Miller v. Brooks, 123 N.C. App. 20, 27, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (1996) (video camera).
106. Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir. 1976).
107. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716, 717–18 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
108. Stilson v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 104 Cal. Rptr. 581, 582 (Ct. App. 1972).
109. McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 346 (Or. 1975).
110. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 826–27 (Iowa 2008); Miller,
123 N.C. App. at 27, 472 S.E.2d at 354–55.
111. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 895.50(2)(a) (1977).
112. 123 N.C. App. 20, 472 S.E.2d 350 (1996).
113. See id. at 27, 472 S.E.2d at 355.
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highly offensive intrusion of his seclusion.114 While agreeing that the
wife’s intrusion was highly offensive, the Miller court noted that in
some cases a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy might be less
for married persons than it is for single individuals, in part depending
on the living arrangements of the spouses.115
White v. White116 presents the type of case alluded to in Miller in
that what constitutes a highly offensive intrusion can be different for
spouses who share a residence than it is for individuals who do not
live in the same home.117 In White, a New Jersey court recognized that
a husband had lesser expectations of privacy in a family computer
shared by him, his wife, and their three children.118 After finding a
letter the husband wrote to his girlfriend, the wife in White hired an
investigator to search the family computer for more evidence of
communications between the husband and his girlfriend.119 The
investigator discovered that the husband had inadvertently saved all
of his emails to the hard drive of the computer and those emails could
be accessed from the hard drive without using a password.120 The
investigator examined the documents saved on the hard drive of the
family computer and discovered emails and photos sent between the
husband and his girlfriend.121
The husband argued, inter alia, that the wife intruded upon his
seclusion by accessing his emails.122 Rejecting the husband’s claim, the
court noted,
Expectations of privacy are established by general social
norms . . . . A person’s expectation of privacy to a room used for
storage and to which others have keys and access is not
reasonable . . . . [The husband] lived in the sun room of the
marital residence; the children and [the wife] were in and out of
this room on a regular basis. The computer was in this room
and the entire family had access to it and used it. Whatever [the
husband’s] subjective beliefs were as to his privacy, objectively,

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 26–27, 472 S.E.2d at 354.
Id. at 27, 472 S.E.2d at 355.
781 A.2d 85 (N.J. 2001).
Id. at 91–92.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 87–88.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
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any expectation of privacy under these conditions is not
reasonable.123
Subsequent cases have similarly concluded that rights of privacy
in a shared computer are lesser than rights of privacy in a computer
with a sole user.124 However, courts have acknowledged that while a
spouse’s right of privacy in a commonly used piece of property—like
a computer or a bedroom—may be less than a non-spouse’s right of
privacy due to the shared use of the property, that does not mean
there is no intra-spousal right of privacy.125
For example, in In re Marriage of Tigges,126 a husband who
suspected his wife was having an affair installed a video camera in the
alarm clock located in his wife’s bedroom and videotaped her without
her knowledge while he was out of the house.127 After divorcing her
husband, the wife successfully filed an invasion of privacy suit against
him.128 In holding for the wife, the Tigges court stated that the wife
did not “forfeit through marriage her expectation of privacy as to her
activities when she was alone in the bedroom.”129
B.

Statutorily Protected Rights of Privacy

The majority of federal courts have also recognized intra-spousal
privacy rights in existing statutes, specifically in the context of
violations of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (“Wiretap Act”).130 Under the Wiretap Act, it is unlawful
for “any person” to “willfully intercept[], endeavor[] to intercept, or
procure[] any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire or oral communication.”131 Violations of the Wiretap Act are
123. Id. at 92.
124. See, e.g., Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 761 (N.D. Ohio 2013); see
also Byrne v. Byrne, 650 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that a wife had full
rights to the computer’s memory of her husband’s work laptop that was left in the family
home).
125. See, e.g., Miller v. Brooks, 123 N.C. App. 20, 27, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (1996) (“[A]
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy might, in some cases, be less for married
persons than for single persons.”). As cases like Miller have shown, though, spouses still
retain at least some rights of privacy. Id. (holding that hiding a video camera in a spouse’s
home is a sufficient claim “for invasion of privacy by intrusion on his seclusion, solitude, or
private affairs”).
126. 758 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 2008).
127. Id. at 825.
128. Id. at 830.
129. Id. at 828.
130. Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2015).
131. Id. § 2511(1)(a).
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punishable by both civil and criminal penalties, including a fine of up
to $10,000 and a five-year term of imprisonment.132 Perhaps more
importantly for some family law cases, any evidence obtained in
violation of the Wiretap Act cannot be admitted into evidence.133
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first
addressed the application of the Wiretap Act to spouses in Simpson v.
Simpson.134 In Simpson, a husband, who harbored uncertainties about
his wife’s faithfulness, recorded his wife’s telephone conversations
without her knowledge.135 Following their divorce, the wife filed a
civil suit for damages against her then ex-husband, asserting that he
violated the Wiretap Act by willfully intercepting her wire
communications without her consent.136 The Fifth Circuit, while
noting that the husband violated the “naked language” of the statute,
which prohibited “any person” from intercepting wire
communications, held that the statute did not apply to married
couples.137 The Simpson court reached this conclusion based on its
view that Congress did not intend for the statute to apply to spouses
because “only a minor portion [of congressional testimony] was with
reference to the marital setting.”138 The Simpson court stated that
“personal surveillance by the other spouse . . . is consistent with
whatever expectation of privacy spouses might have vis-à-vis each
other within the marital home.”139
The Simpson court’s holding that the Wiretap Act did not create
an intra-spousal right of privacy was quickly questioned by other

132. Id. § 2511(1)(d).
133. Id. § 2515.
134. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled by Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212 (11th
Cir. 2003).
135. Id. at 804.
136. Id. at 804–05.
137. Id. at 805 & n.4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1974)).
138. Id. at 808.
139. Id. at 809. See Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In
Remington, a wife spied on her husband by hiring a detective agency to place a
wiretapping device in the home telephone, thus allowing the wife to record conversations
the husband had with his attorney. Id. at 900. The Remington court held that “Congress
apparently did not intend to provide a Federal remedy for persons aggrieved by the
personal acts of their spouses committed within the marital home,” but that the facts
presented in Remington were distinguishable from those in Simpson and granted the
husband a right of action. Id. at 901. See William J. Holt, Note, Interspousal Electronic
Surveillance Immunity, 7 TOLEDO L. REV. 185, 185–86 (1975) (explaining that the
Remington court agreed with the Fifth Circuit holding but deemed it inapplicable).
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federal courts and, in some instances, rejected.140 Two years after
Simpson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held in United States v. Jones141 that a husband violated the statute by
placing a wiretapping device in the home of his estranged wife.142 The
Jones court directly contradicted the Simpson court by recognizing
that the legislative history of the Wiretap Act indicated that Congress
did intend to apply the statute to domestic relations.143 Further, in
direct opposition to the Simpson court, the Jones court interpreted
the “any person” language of the statute as including spouses.144
In the wake of Jones and Simpson, other courts remained split on
whether the Wiretap Act included an intra-spousal right of privacy in
communications, with the Second Circuit following Simpson,145 but
the Fourth Circuit and the bulk of the federal district courts following
Jones.146
The split between Jones and Simpson dissipated after the
Wiretap Act was amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 (“ECPA”).147 The ECPA was designed to update the
Wiretap Act to “protect against the unauthorized interception of
electronic communications . . . in light of the dramatic changes in new
computer and telecommunications technologies.”148 The ECPA
amended the Wiretap Act by making it unlawful for “any person” to
intercept or endeavor to intercept not only wire and oral
communications, but also electronic communications.149 In amending
the Wiretap Act, Congress retained the provisions of the Wiretap Act
that made violations of the statute punishable by civil fines and

140. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 373–74 (4th Cir. 1984); United
States. v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 672–73 (6th Cir. 1976).
141. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
142. See id. at 672–73.
143. Id. at 669.
144. Id. at 671.
145. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 678–79 (2d Cir. 1977). Some state
courts have also followed the Simpson opinion. See Stewart v. Stewart, 645 So. 2d 1319,
1321–22 (Miss. 1994); Baumrind v. Ewing, 279 S.E.2d 359, 360 (S.C. 1981).
146. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 373–74 (4th Cir. 1984); Nations v.
Nations, 670 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp.
1041, 1044–45 (E.D. Ill. 1982); Gill v. Willer, 482 F. Supp. 776, 778 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Kratz
v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
147. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
148. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012).
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imprisonment, as well as those provisions that excluded any evidence
obtained in violation of the statute.150
With the advent of the ECPA, federal courts unanimously took
the position that spouses retained a federally protected right of
privacy in their communications.151 For example, in Heggy v. Heggy,152
a husband recorded his wife’s telephone conversations without her
knowledge.153 The Tenth Circuit held that spouses were included in
the ECPA’s statement that it was unlawful for “any person” to
intercept communications.154 The Eleventh Circuit reached the same
conclusion on almost identical facts in Glazner v. Glazner,155 thus
overruling its predecessor circuit decision in Simpson.156
Forty-eight states have adopted a state statute akin to the
ECPA.157 Like the majority of federal courts, state courts generally
150. Id. § 2511(4)(a) (providing for criminal penalties); id. § 2515 (excluding
intercepted communications from being used as evidence); id. § 2520 (allowing for the
recovery of civil fines).
151. See Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989).
152. 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991).
153. Id. at 1538.
154. Id. at 1540.
155. 347 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 2003).
156. Id. at 1215–16. In Glazner, a husband recorded his wife’s telephone conversations
without her knowledge or the knowledge of third parties. Id. at 1214. The Glazner court
read the plain language of the ECPA to include spouses because spouses were “any
person” thus bringing the Eleventh Circuit in line with the bulk of jurisprudence
addressing the issue. Id. at 1214–15 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2003)). It was, however,
a reversal of the previous law of the circuit, namely the rule stated in Simpson. See
Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1924). Simpson was decided in 1974, prior
to the Eleventh Circuit’s split from the Fifth Circuit in 1980, but when the Eleventh Circuit
was created, the court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
157. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT.
§ 42.20.310 (LEXIS through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. and 5th Spec. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3005 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120
(LEXIS through 2016 laws); CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess. laws); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-304 (LEXIS through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-189 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Feb. Reg. Sess. and 2016 Sept.
Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016, ch.
430); FLA. STAT. ANN § 934.03 (West, Westlaw 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 1611-62 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 803-42 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Spec.
Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 18-6702 (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/14-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-934 of 2016 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-46-8.5-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Second Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.010 (West, Westlaw through 2017
Reg. Sess. ch. 7); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary
Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 710 (West, Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess.);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.);
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have held that state statutes striving to protect the privacy of
communications apply to spouses.158 For example, in O’Brien v.
O’Brien,159 a wife installed spyware on her husband’s computer
without his knowledge that took screenshots of the husband’s online
conversations via email, instant messenger, and other online chatting
devices.160 The court held that the wife violated Florida’s version of
the ECPA, and therefore the evidence the wife obtained regarding
the husband chatting online with another woman could not be
admitted in the divorce proceeding of the husband and wife.161
In addition to the ECPA,162 states have adopted other statutory
measures to protect individuals’ privacy, which have been interpreted

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 99 (West, Westlaw through ch. 1 of 2017 1st Ann.
Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539c (West, Westlaw through No. 516 of 2016 Reg.
Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. ch. 3); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 41-29-533 (LEXIS through 2017 Reg. Sess. H.B. 32); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-8-213 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-203 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.650 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2016 Spec. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess., ch. 330); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West, Westlaw through
2017, J.R. No. 1); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (Mckinney, Westlaw through 2016, ch. 6); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-287 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02 (LEXIS through 2016 Spec. Legis.
Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (West, Westlaw through 131st Gen. Assemb.);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1202 (West, Westlaw through ch. 395 of 2016 2d Sess.); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 18 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. Acts 1–109); 11 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-35-21 (LEXIS through 2016 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-20 (2015);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (Westlaw through 2016 Sess. laws); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-601 (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4 (West, Westlaw through 2016 4th Spec. Sess.);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. and Spec. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1D-3 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 2d Extraordinary Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Wis. Act 392); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-702 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Budget
Sess.). The only states without a state ECPA are Missouri and Vermont. Both Missouri
and Vermont have adopted other state statutes that prohibit the unlawful use of another’s
computer. MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.095 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4103 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
158. E.g., Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), writ denied per
curiam, 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1996).
159. 899 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
160. Id. at 1134.
161. Id. at 1137.
162. Beyond the ECPA at the federal level, there is also the Stored Communications
Act, which could help protect intra-spousal privacy. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2015). While
the federal and state ECPAs prohibit interception of electronic communications, the
federal Stored Communications Act prohibits the intentional access to any electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage of “a facility through which [the] electronic
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as applying to spouses.163 For example, all states but one have a
criminal statute prohibiting the fraudulent access to computers.164
communication service is provided.” Id. § 2701(a). The difference in the Stored
Communications Act and the ECPA is that the former protects against the unauthorized
riffling through of an individual’s email account, for example, to find electronic
transmissions that were previously sent and received, the latter protects against
contemporaneous unauthorized interceptions of electronic transmissions. Id. § 2701(a)(1)–
(2); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848,
1850. Accordingly, a spouse who installs keylogger software on a computer (such that he
can learn the passwords of his spouse’s email accounts) and then uses those passwords to
read emails sent to his spouse that his spouse has already read does not violate the ECPA
because the emails were not intercepted. Bailey v. Bailey, No. 2:07-CV-11672, 2008 WL
324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008). See United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831,
835–36 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that use of keylogger software did not violate the ECPA
because the interception occurred at the keyboard). However, the same spying spouse
may be in violation of the Stored Communications Act because the emails were in the
electronic storage of the email account. See Bailey, 2008 WL 324156, at *6; Miller v.
Meyers, 766 F. Supp. 2d 919, 923 (W.D. Ark. 2011).
Though some courts have interpreted the Stored Communications Act as
completing the privacy protections in an individual’s electronic communications, many
courts have given the Act a very narrow interpretation, thus opening up large legal
loopholes for prying eyes. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012)
(holding that a copy of an email retained in an email account does not qualify as electronic
storage unless a second copy of that email exists elsewhere, otherwise, the email found in
the account does not qualify as an email being stored for purposes of “backup”
protection); Robert M. Goldstein & Marin G. Weinberg, The Stored Communications Act
and Private E-Mail Communications, 31 CHAMPION, Aug. 2007, at 2, 7 (asserting that the
government takes the position that the Stored Communications Act applies only to unread
emails); Cary J. Mogerman & Stephanie L. Jones, The New Era of Electronic
Eavesdropping and Divorce: An Analysis of the Federal Law Relating to Eavesdropping
and Privacy in the Internet Age, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 481, 482–83 (2008) (“The
Stored Communications Act regulates communications that have been communicated by a
sender but have not been received by the intended recipient (such as voicemail messages
waiting to be listened to by the recipient or unread e-mails in an inbox).”); see also Bailey,
2008 WL 324156, at *7 (holding that the Act does not apply to any stored copies of emails
on the hard drive of a computer because such stored copies of emails are not part of the
storage of the electronic communication service). The limited application of the Stored
Communications Act has made it a relatively toothless provision for the purposes of
finding a right of privacy between spouses. See Richard C. Turkington, Protection for
Invasions of Conversational and Communication Privacy by Electronic Surveillance in
Family, Marriage, and Domestic Disputes Under Federal and State Wiretap and Store
Communications Acts and the Common Law Privacy Intrusion Tort, 82 NEB. L. REV. 693,
722 (2004).
163. E.g., Miller, 766 F. Supp. at 924–25 (holding that Arkansas’s computer trespass
statute applied to a husband who used key-logger software to access his wife’s email and
social media accounts without her authorization).
164. All states, except Washington, have statutes in effect like Michigan’s that prohibit
the unauthorized use of another’s computer. See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-112 (Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess. and Act 2016-485 of 1st Spec. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.740
(LEXIS through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. and 5th Spec. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132316 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-203 (LEXIS through
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Under these statutes, it is generally unlawful for a person to
intentionally and without authorization access a computer, computer
program, computer system, or computer network of another.165 In the
case of People v. Walker,166 the Michigan Supreme Court refused to
overturn a lower court’s holding that the Michigan version of this
statute applied to spouses.167

2016 3d Extraordinary Sess.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West, Westlaw through all 2016
Reg. Sess. laws); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102 (LEXIS through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.
laws); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-251 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and
Sept. 2016 Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 932 (West, Westlaw through 80 Del.
Laws, ch. 430); FLA. STAT. § 815.06 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93 (Supp. 2016); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 708-890 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Spec. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 182202 (LEXIS through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-51 (West,
Westlaw through P.A. 99-934 of 2016 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-3 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.6B (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5839 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
and Spec. Sess.); KY. STAT. ANN. § 434.850 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 14:73.5 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary Sess.); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A § 432 (Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 7-302 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 120F
(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st Ann. Sess., ch. 1); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.795
(West, Westlaw through No. 516 of 2016 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.891 (West,
Westlaw through ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-5 (LEXIS through
2016 Reg. Sess. H.B. 32); MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.095 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-311 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1343.01 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 205.4765 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2016 Spec. Sess.); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 638:17 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess., ch. 330); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:20-25 (West, Westlaw through 2017, J.R. No. 1); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-45-5 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (Mckinney, Westlaw
through 2016, ch. 6); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-454 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08
(LEXIS through 2016 Spec. Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.04 (West,
Westlaw through 131st Gen. Assemb.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1958 (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.377 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7611 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-2 (LEXIS through Jan. 2016 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-16-20 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43B-1 (Westlaw through 2016 Sess. laws);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-602 (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703 (West, Westlaw through 2016 4th
Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4103 (LEXIS through 2015 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-152.5 (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-13 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d
Extraordinary Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-506 (LEXIS through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
165. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.795(a) (Westlaw).
166. 813 N.W.2d 750 (Mich. 2012) (mem.); People v. Walker, No. 304593, 2011 WL
6786935, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2011), appeal denied, 813 N.W.2d 750 (Mich.
2012).
167. Walker, 813 N.W.2d at 750. See Walker, 2011 WL 6786935, at *8.
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In Walker, a wife’s third husband allegedly accessed her email
without her consent, and, in doing so, found evidence that the wife
was having an affair with her second husband.168 The third husband
gave the evidence he discovered in the wife’s email to the wife’s first
husband, and the first husband attempted to use the email evidence to
gain custody of the child the first husband had fathered with the
wife.169 After being served with an emergency custody motion from
the first husband, the wife notified the authorities that her third
husband had hacked into her email accounts.170 The third husband
was subsequently charged with violating Michigan’s Fraudulent
Access to Computers statute.171 The third husband in Walker asserted
that the Michigan statute did not apply to spouses, but Michigan
courts rejected his argument.172 Although the Michigan court held the
text of the statute applied to spouses, multiple justices on the
Michigan Supreme Court expressed their concern with criminalizing
intra-spousal spying.173 Justice Markman noted in his concurrence that
the statute potentially encompassed “an extremely broad range of
conduct” and urged “the Legislature to consider whether it intends to
criminalize the full range of conduct to which the statute potentially
extends.”174
Walker highlights the sentiment of many state and federal
courts—spouses have a right of privacy vis-à-vis one another. Both
the common law and statutory protections of privacy apply to
spouses. That application, though, creates some uneasiness from
courts on both sides of the issue: in Walker, the justices had concerns
regarding criminalizing spousal spying;175 in Simpson, the Fifth Circuit
noted it had doubts about its conclusion to find no intra-spousal right
of privacy in the Wiretap Act.176 Courts have been and continue to be
uncomfortable treading into the issue of determining when one
spouse violates the other’s right of privacy.

168. Walker, 2011 WL 6786935, at *1.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *1–2.
172. Id. at *8–9. See Walker, 813 N.W.2d at 750 (denying defendant’s leave to appeal
the judgment from the Court of Appeals).
173. See, e.g., Walker, 813 N.W.2d at 750–51 (Markman, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 810 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled by Glazner v.
Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2003).
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As uncomfortable as they may be, courts at this time appear to
recognize that spouses have a right of privacy from one another.177
However, there remains uncertainty in how far courts are willing to
stretch what a reasonable spouse would find to be a highly offensive
intrusion upon his seclusion. Despite the one bright-line rule that it is
unlawful to videotape a spouse without their knowledge, there is far
more gray area in the context of electronic communications.
The Walker case also highlights the growing need to determine
the contours of intra-spousal privacy. After the third husband in
Walker lost his motion regarding the application of the Fraudulent
Access to Computer statute to spouses before the Michigan Supreme
Court, the case against him was set to go to trial during the summer of
2012.178 The charges against the third husband, however, were
dropped mere days before the trial was to begin because the
prosecutor’s office learned that the wife had been simultaneously
spying on the third husband by accessing his text messages without his
authorization.179 Thus, Walker demonstrates not only the difficulty in
reconciling an intra-spousal right of privacy with the digital age, but it
also highlights how often spouses violate each other’s rights of
privacy.
Perhaps more importantly, though, the Walker case exemplifies
why many spouses engage in intra-spousal spying—leverage.
Evidence of adultery for purposes of obtaining a divorce is no longer
necessary, as all states have adopted no-fault divorce.180 Evidence of
adultery, however, can create an advantage with regard to child
custody and spousal support.181 Moreover, in some jurisdictions—
177. E.g., Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 669, 673 (6th Cir. 1976).
178. Walker, 813 N.W.2d at 750.
179. L.L. Brasier, Charges Against Man in E-Mail Case Are Dropped After Wife
Snooped, Too, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 14, 2012, at A1; Final Charges Dropped in
Husband-Wife Hacking Case, CBS DETROIT (July 21, 2012, 8:29 AM), http://detroit
.cbslocal.com/2012/07/21/final-charges-dropped-in-husband-wife-hacking-case/ [https://perma
.cc/S2V7-CL76].
180. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-903(5) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.);
Rebecca Brennan, Note, Mismatch.com: Online Dispute Resolution and Divorce, 13
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 197, 198 n.11 (2011) (explaining that New York was the
last state to adopt no-fault divorce in 2010).
181. For example, in Louisiana, child custody is determined based on which
arrangement would be in the best interest of the child. LA. CIV. CODE art. 131 (Westlaw
through 2016 2d Extraordinary Sess.). Among the factors for determining the best interest
of the child are the “moral fitness” of the parents. Id. art. 134(6). The sexual relationships
of the parents have been taken into consideration in determining their “moral fitness.”
E.g., Crowson v. Crowson, 742 So. 2d 107, 112 (La. Ct. App. 1999). Arizona courts have
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including some community property jurisdictions—evidence of
wrongdoing by one spouse can impact the division of property.182 The
prevalence of spousal spying combined with the reasons that spousal
spying occurs, makes intra-spousal privacy an issue courts throughout
the United States will continue to face in the future.
III. THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY OVERLAY ON PRIVACY
Intra-spousal privacy is a particularly complex issue for the nine
community property jurisdictions in the United States where property
created or acquired during marriage is classified as community
property, meaning that both spouses have a joint ownership interest
in the property from the moment it is acquired. For community
property jurisdictions, what rights of privacy spouses have vis-à-vis
one another is more complicated because, to the extent that
community property is jointly owned by spouses, it is unclear whether
one spouse has the authority to preclude the other spouse from
accessing that property. These privacy concerns are further
compounded by the managerial schemes applied to community
property.
A. Privacy and Ownership
Community property ownership rules complicate a spouse’s right
of privacy because, generally, all property created or acquired during
the marriage’s existence is jointly owned by the spouses. This joint
ownership creates the possibility that spouses in community property
jurisdictions have few, if any, rights of privacy from one another.
Community property jurisdictions have not yet provided much
guidance on this issue. Examining how other forms of joint
ownership, such as co-ownership, impact privacy rights may help
further understand privacy in a community property system.
Furthermore, guidance may be gained by studying property where
two or more people have possessory rights, such as employer property
that is used by employees.

similarly allowed acts of adultery to impact custody. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous,
436 P.2d 157, 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) (“The [mother’s] shameless rampage of adultery,
established through admission and unrepudiated evidence, demonstrates she is morally
unfit to have custody.”).
182. WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL & SALLY BROWN RICHARDSON,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 350–51 (8th ed. 2015).
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1. Ownership in Community Property Regimes
Community property, as recognized in the United States,
provides that spouses share in the acquisitions and gains of one
another during the marriage.183 Accordingly, community property
includes all of the property “which is increased or multiplied during
marriage” by onerous cause.184 In defining community property,
Louisiana—the first state to adopt a community property regime—
originally stated,
The partnership, or community consists of the profits of all the
effects of which the husband has the administration and
enjoyment; of the produce of the reciprocal labor and industry
of both husband and wife; and of the estates which they may
acquire during the marriage either by donations made jointly to
them both, or by purchase, or in any other similar way, even
although the purchase may be only in the name of one of the
two and not of both, because in that case the period of time
when the purchase was made is alone attended to and not the
person who made the purchase.185
Modern definitions of community property are much simpler, but
cover the same ground.186 For example, the Arizona statute defining
community property states, “All property acquired by either husband

183. See RICHARD A. BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF
HUSBAND AND WIFE, UNDER THE COMMUNITY OR GANACIAL SYSTEM § 5, at 23–30
(Seattle, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1895); WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J.
VAUGHAN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1, at 2 (2d ed. 1971); Nina Nichols
Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV.
1, 1–2 (1969).
184. BALLINGER, supra note 183, § 5, at 205 (footnote omitted); see also GEORGE
MCKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 297, at 211–12 (2d ed.
1925).
185. A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS
WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO ITS PRESENT FORM OF
GOVERNMENT 336 (New Orleans, Bradford & Anderson 1808).
186. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary
Sess.). Today, community property is defined in article 2338 of the Louisiana Civil Code as
property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill,
or industry of either spouse; property acquired with community things or with
community and separate things, unless classified as separate property under
Article 2341; property donated to the spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits of
community property; damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to
the community; and all other property not classified by law as separate property.
Id.
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or wife during the marriage is the community property of the husband
and wife.”187
Despite the overarching definition of jurisdictions like Arizona,
there are a number of exceptions to the rule that all property created
or acquired during marriage is community property. For example,
property acquired by using separate property188 and property received
as inheritance or a donation to a spouse individually189 are classified
as separate property.190 In some jurisdictions, the profits of separate
property retain their separate classification.191 Spouses may also
contract out of the community property regime through a pre- or
post-nuptial agreement, thereby establishing that all or some of the
property acquired during marriage is owned separately.192
Though some property created or acquired during a marriage
may be separate property, the vast majority of property gained during
a marriage is community property. Such community property can
include traditional forms of real property, such as land and buildings,
and also personal property such as salaries, retirement accounts, and
187. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.). Other
states define community property in the same manner. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 760
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. laws); IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (LEXIS through
2016 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess. and 2016 Spec. Sess.).
188. E.g., Burlingham v. Burlingham, 384 P.2d 699, 705 (N.M. 1963) (noting that
separate property does not lose its separate classification when comingled with
“community property, unless . . . [it] cannot be traced and identified”); Boyd v. Boyd, 131
S.W.3d 605, 616 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that property acquired with separate
property is classified as separate property).
189. E.g., Bilbao v. Bilbao, 205 P.3d 311, 313–14 (Alaska 2009) (citing Schmitz v.
Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1127 (Alaska 2004)).
190. There are other exceptions to the general rule that property created or acquired
during marriage is community property. Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Wash.
1984). Accordingly, damages received for pain and suffering are classified as separate
property, see, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.); Soto v. Vandeventer, 245 P.2d 826, 832 (N.M. 1952), whereas damages for the
recovery of lost earnings are classified as community property, because the earnings that
the damages are replacing would have been community property, see, e.g., Graham v.
Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. 1972); Brown, 675 P.2d at 1212.
191. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213(A) (Westlaw); CAL. FAM. CODE § 770
(Westlaw); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.130 (Westlaw). Jurisdictions that classify the
profits differently from separate properties are collectively referred to as American Rule
jurisdictions, whereas jurisdictions that classify the profits of separate property as
community property are referred to as Civil Law Jurisdictions. REPPY ET AL., supra note
182, at 179–80.
192. E.g., Lebeck v. Lebeck, 881 P.2d 727, 734–35 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). But see Button
v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 551–52 (Wis. 1986) (requiring that postnuptial agreements be
substantively fair); Moore v. Moore, 383 S.W.3d 190, 194–95 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012)
(requiring that prenuptial agreements be entered into voluntarily).
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intellectual property.193 Moreover, community property jurisdictions
also apply joint ownership to more modern forms of property, such as
emails, blog posts, Snapchat photos, and Facebook statuses.194
That community property is automatically jointly owned by both
spouses during the marriage is arguably the distinguishing factor
between community and separate property regimes. As community
property scholar Thomas Oldham has stated, the difference in
community property and separate property regimes is relatively
minor when a marriage terminates, be it by death or divorce.195 Most,
if not all, separate property states have adopted equitable remedies at
divorce,196 and instruments like the elective share provide means for a
surviving spouse to keep a percentage of the property earned by the
other spouse when the earning spouse dies.197
During an intact marriage, however, there are great differences
between community property and separate property jurisdictions. As
Oldham notes, “spouses in community property states are equal
owners of all property acquired during marriage due to either’s effort,
regardless of title[,]” and that equal ownership applies from the
moment the property is acquired.198
193. See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying community
property law to copyright); In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Ct. App.
1987) (applying community property law to copyright); Michel v. Michel, 484 So. 2d 829,
833 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a community property interest in a writing); Alsenz
v. Alsenz, 101 S.W.3d 649, 653 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (applying community property law to
patents). See generally Richardson, Classifying Virtual Property, supra note 15, at 742–46
(discussing the application of community property classification rules to intellectual
property).
194. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary
Sess.); Richardson, Classifying Virtual Property, supra note 15, at 758–70 (contemplating
how URLs, websites, email accounts, and Facebook profiles can be classified as
community property).
195. Oldham, supra note 6, at 99.
196. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.)
(stating that at a divorce proceeding the court must begin with the premise that marital
assets and liabilities will be equal between the spouses); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236(B)(5)(c)
(McKinney, Westlaw through Jan. 23, 2016) (providing that marital property is to be
divided equitably between the spouses at divorce); see also Margaret M. Mahoney, The
Equitable Distribution of Marital Debts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 445, 445–46 (2010) (discussing
the equitable division of debts in separate property jurisdictions). But see Allison Anna
Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1260–62 (2015) (discussing how equitable
division statutes have not achieved true equality in divorce).
197. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). But see Terry L.
Turnipseed, Community Property v. the Elective Share, 72 LA. L. REV. 161, 161–62 (2011)
(arguing that the community property regime is more advantageous than the elective
share because the elective share can be avoided through trusts).
198. Oldham, supra note 6, at 100.
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The question for community property jurisdictions is thus
whether one spouse has a right of privacy in property jointly owned
with the other spouse. This question remains, unsurprisingly,
unanswered by courts in community property jurisdictions. With
regard to intact marriages, courts are hesitant to interfere with how
spouses use community property, given that if spouses are unable to
amicably resolve how such property is to be used, divorce is likely
imminent.199 For spouses who divorce, any issues regarding a claim
one spouse may have against the other for unlawful intrusion usually
do not make it before a judge, given that the vast majority of divorce
cases settle out of court.200
Though no court in a community property jurisdiction has
discussed the intersection of community property ownership rules and
spousal privacy, at least one court in a separate property jurisdiction
has held that a spouse has no right of privacy in property in which
both spouses possess a marital property interest.201 In State v.
Hormann,202 a husband installed a tracking device on the car his wife
drove.203 The question facing the Minnesota appellate court was
whether the husband violated a state statute that provided that no
person could install a tracking device on a vehicle without consent of
the owner of the vehicle.204 The Hormann court held that the husband
did not violate the statute because the car was marital property, and,
as marital property, both spouses had an ownership interest in the
vehicle.205 The husband did not violate the statute because an owner
of the vehicle—namely him—consented to the tracking device being
placed on the vehicle.206
While courts in community property jurisdictions have not
addressed how privacy law and community property ownership laws
interact, at least two courts in Louisiana (a community property
jurisdiction) have concluded that community property debt rules
supplant a spouse’s right of privacy for at least some forms of
199. Id. at 122.
200. Jeff Landers, Divorcing Women: Is It Best to Litigate or Settle?, FORBES (May 22,
2014, 9:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2014/05/22/divorcing-women-isit-best-to-litigate-or-settle/#52ea038254d6 [https://perma.cc/HG89-T5BS (staff-uploaded
archive)] (“In fact, it’s estimated that 95% of divorces are settled out of court.”).
201. See State v. Hormann, 805 N.W.2d 883, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
202. 805 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
203. Id. at 892.
204. Id. at 892–93.
205. Id. at 893–94.
206. Id.
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property.207 In all community property jurisdictions, debts incurred
during the existence of the community and for the benefit of the
community are classified as community debts and may be satisfied by
using community property.208 In Hennig v. Alltel Communications,
Inc.,209 a husband sought his wife’s cell phone records from her cell
phone service provider without the wife’s consent.210 Upon receiving
the cell phone records, the husband filed for divorce on the basis of
adultery.211 The wife then sued the cell phone service provider,
alleging, among other things, that it violated her right of privacy.212
The court summarily rejected the wife’s claim, stating that the
husband was “legally entitled to view the records associated with a
community debt.”213
The use of community property debt rules to overcome an
individual spouse’s right of privacy in a case like Hennig makes it easy
to imagine a community property jurisdiction reaching the same
conclusion as the Hormann court based on community property
ownership rules. If community property jurisdictions find that
community property ownership rules allow spouses to place tracking
devices on community-owned vehicles or access community-owned
cell phone records without the consent of the other spouse, spousal
privacy in community property jurisdictions will essentially be
vitiated.
Just as the Hennig court used community debt law to preclude an
individual spouse’s right of privacy in community property,214 some
community property jurisdictions have passed legislation regarding
the duties spouses owe one another with regard to community
property; the breadth of those duties imply there are few, if any,

207. Hennig v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 903 So. 2d 1137, 1141 (La. Ct. App. 2005);
Pennison v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617, 618 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
208. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 683 P.2d 705, 711 (Ariz. 1982).
209. 903 So. 2d 1137 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
210. Id. at 1139.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1138–39.
213. Id. at 1141. The court in Pennison v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So.
2d 617 (La. Ct. App. 1963), reached the same conclusion with regards to medical records,
id. at 618. In Pennison, the husband acquired his wife’s medical records from a hospital
without the wife’s consent. Id. The wife sued the hospital for violating her privacy by
disclosing her medical records. Id. The court rejected the wife’s argument that her privacy
was violated, and held the hospital bill created a community debt for which the husband
was responsible. Id. Thus, the husband had the right to examine the wife’s medical
records, even without her consent. Id.
214. Hennig, 903 So. 2d at 1141.
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privacy rights for spouses.215 For example, California Family Code
section 1100(e) requires that a spouse “make full disclosure to the
other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the
existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the
community has or may have an interest.”216 Other jurisdictions have
similarly established that spouses owe one another a fiduciary duty to
act in good faith with all community property.217
Courts’ applications of these intra-spousal duties have thus far
always pertained to financial decisions made by one spouse.218
California courts have applied the fiduciary duties and disclosure
requirements to pensions and other retirement accounts.219 Louisiana
has applied its spousal fiduciary duties to sales of community
property, such as stock options.220
At least one California court has implicitly allowed intra-spousal
spying into financial affairs. In In re Marriage of Feldman,221 a wife
secretly copied documents relating to a 401(k) account her husband
established without her knowledge.222 Thereafter, the wife filed for
divorce.223 During the divorce proceeding, the husband did not
disclose the 401(k) account.224 The husband argued he did not breach
any fiduciary duty he owed to his wife because she had been secretly
copying the 401(k) account documents throughout their marriage.225
The Feldman court rejected the husband’s argument, stating that the
401(k) account was community property and the husband was in a
superior position to access documents relating to the account, thus he
had the duty to disclose information concerning the account to his
wife.226 The fact the wife had secretly obtained information regarding

215. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(e) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.
laws).
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.15(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 392);
Gerow v. Covill, 960 P.2d 55, 64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); In re Marriage of Duffy, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 160, 169–70 (Ct. App. 2001).
218. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lucero, 173 Cal. Rptr. 680 (Ct. App. 1981) (reviewing a
husband’s decision to borrow money from his retirement account).
219. See, e.g., In re Stanifer, 236 B.R. 709, 717 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); In re Marriage of
Feldman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 42 (Ct. App. 2007); Lucero, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
220. Ogden v. Ogden, 331 So. 2d 592, 597 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
221. 64 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1967).
222. Id. at 42.
223. Id. at 32.
224. Id. at 41.
225. Id. at 42.
226. Id.
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the 401(k) account did not impact the husband’s disclosure duties.227
Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of intra-spousal privacy,
the Feldman court did not object to the secretive means by which the
wife obtained the financial documents.228
In analyzing the outcomes of the previous cases where spouses
have failed to disclose financial assets or made poor financial
decisions (at least in hindsight), it is not a far stretch to interpret
statutes like California Family Code section 1100(e) as requiring the
disclosure of all community property. Applying this interpretation,
statutes, like California Family Code section 1100(e), might require
the disclosure of community property which one spouse might rather
keep private, like a diary or an email account. Such community
property may be of no monetary value at the time disclosure is
required, but nothing in current community property law requires
that only positively valued property be disclosed to the other
spouse.229 Even without statutes requiring disclosure of community
property assets, the very nature of joint ownership might be
interpreted to prohibit spouses from hiding community property from
one another, regardless of the property’s financial worth.
Reading a disclosure requirement into community-owned
property, whether because of statutes or because of the inherent
nature of community property, calls into question the level of privacy
spouses may possess in certain forms of property. Modern cars with
built-in GPS systems have the ability to track the location of the
vehicle.230 Most cell phones today possess the same ability.231 If a car

227. Id.
228. Id. The Feldman court did not issue any reprimand to the wife for her means of
acquiring information regarding the husband’s 401(k) account. Id. To the contrary, the
court chided the husband for not producing information regarding his 401(k) account prior
to his wife producing the evidence regarding the account that she had secretly obtained.
Id.
229. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(e) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.
laws).
230. Chris Woodyard & Jane O’Donnell, Your Car May Be Invading Your Privacy,
USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2013
/03/24/car-spying-edr-data-privacy/1991751/ [https://perma.cc/4BUX-H2UN].
231. See Drew Prindle, Find Your Phone with These Helpful Tracking Tips, DIGITAL
TRENDS (May 27, 2016, 10:28 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/how-to-track-acell-phone/ [https://perma.cc/4FFQ-4LGQ] (discussing different ways to track a phone
using its GPS system). Government use of built-in GPS systems on most cell phones has
raised numerous questions relating to the Fourth Amendment. See Orin Kerr, 6th Circuit:
No Fourth Amendment Rights in Cell-Site Records, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/04/13/6th-circuit-no-fourth-
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or cell phone is community property, does community ownership
necessarily mean that both spouses have a right to know where the
community property car or cell phone is located at any moment in
time? Current community property law provides no answer to this
question.
2. Comparison to Privacy of Other Joint Owners
Cases like Feldman do not expressly draw a line where
community property law ends and an individual spouse’s right of
privacy begins. Cases like Feldman do, however, imply that spouses
have few, and perhaps no, rights of privacy in community property.232
Given the lack of express jurisprudence on intra-spousal privacy
rights in community property, it is helpful to examine other situations
in which individuals jointly own property, such as co-ownership or
tenancy in common.
For co-owners and tenants in common, each co-owner or cotenant generally has a right to possess the entirety of the property.233
Consequently, a co-owner or co-tenant does not have the right to
exclude the other.234 For example, in Kellum v. Williams,235 when one
co-tenant excluded the other co-tenant from using a water line held in
common, the court concluded that “neither cotenant had a right to
exclude the other from use of this common property[,]” because the
neighbors were co-tenants.236
Courts have reached the same conclusion when the co-owners
are spouses in a separate property regime. In Frost v. Frost,237 a
husband and wife in Missouri jointly owned land, which the husband
sold for $3,000.238 The husband then used the $3,000 to purchase more
land in his name alone.239 The wife sued the husband for her $1,500
share in the proceeds of the sale of the jointly owned land.240 In
amendment-rights-in-cell-site-records/?utm_term=.b305c914b25c [https://perma.cc/HG9SBH9J].
232. See In re Marriage of Feldman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 36, 42 (Ct. App. 1967).
233. See, e.g., Fyffe v. Fyffe, 11 N.E.2d 857, 861–62 (Ill. Ct. App. 1937); O’Brien v.
Ginter, 744 N.Y.S.2d 511, 511 (App. Div. 2002); Mueller v. Allen, 128 P.3d 18, 24 (Utah
Ct. App. 2005).
234. See, e.g., Skalla v. Canepari, 430 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Ark. 2013); Galasso v. Del
Guercio, 276 A.2d 186, 189 (N.J. 1971).
235. 39 So. 2d 573 (Ala. 1949).
236. Id. at 573.
237. 98 S.W. 527 (Mo. 1906).
238. Id. at 527.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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discussing what rights the spouses had in the proceeds, the Frost court
stated that because the land sold was jointly owned by the spouses,
“neither husband nor wife ha[d] an interest in the property to the
exclusion of the other.”241
The inability of one co-owner or co-tenant to exclude the other
from the property held in common implies that joint holders of
property have no right of privacy in their jointly held property.242 As
with community property, no cases specifically address the
intersection of co-ownership and privacy. However, if co-owners
cannot exclude one another, it stands to reason how much privacy coowners can reasonably expect in co-owned property. For example, if
two individuals co-own a diary, and neither co-owner can exclude the
other co-owner from the diary, can either co-owner have a legitimate
expectation of privacy within the diary?
3. Comparison to Employee Privacy in Employers’ Property
Because co-ownership and community property jurisprudence do
not provide specific privacy cases, it may be useful to turn to another
area of law where one individual uses property owned by another
individual and sometimes that use is for private purposes. This issue
arises routinely with regard to employees’ right of privacy from their
employers when using employers’ property. Employees are
undoubtedly different than spouses and other joint owners;
employees do not usually have an ownership interest in the property
they are using because the property interest resides with the
employers. But employees are similar to spouses and other joint
owners in that employees are using property in which another person
has a property interest. Thus, the analogy to employees may prove
helpful for understanding whether spouses could (and if so, should)
retain a right of privacy in property in which another individual,
namely the other spouse, has an ownership interest.
241. Id. at 529.
242. For example, in LeBlanc v. Scurto, 173 So. 2d 322 (La. Ct. App. 1965), three
parties shared an interest in real property that included an alley. Id. at 323. One co-owner
parked large trucks in the alley so as to prevent the other co-owners from accessing the coowned property. Id. at 323–24. The blocked co-owners successfully brought an injunction
to preclude the other co-owner from preventing them from accessing the property. Id. at
325. The court stated that all co-owners have “the right to demand of the other[s] equal
possession and coextensive use of any given spot within the common estate.” Id. Given
that co-owners must provide each other coextensive use and access to all co-owned
property, co-owners seem to enjoy no right of privacy from one another in their co-owned
property.
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In Gates v. Wheeler,243 a court held that such a right of privacy
may exist.244 In Gates, two individuals, Gates and Wheeler, co-owned
an LLC.245 As co-owner and administrator of the LLC’s computer
server, Wheeler had access to Gates’s company email account.246 As
the relationship between Wheeler and Gates deteriorated, Wheeler
reviewed Gates’s emails, including communications Gates had with
his attorneys and his wife.247 When Gates learned that Wheeler had
intercepted his emails without his consent, Gates successfully sought a
temporary injunction.248
In appealing the temporary injunction, Wheeler argued that the
district court abused its discretion by granting the injunction because
Gates could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the LLC
email account since it was a work email account owned by the LLC.249
The Gates court recognized that jurisdictions were split on whether an
employee has a right of privacy in a work email account,250 thus
indicating that the trial court had not abused its discretion in granting
the temporary injunction.251
The court in Gates is correct to say that jurisprudence on
employee privacy runs the gamut from holding employees have some
rights of privacy to holding that employees have no right of privacy
when using an employer’s property.252 For example, in Smyth v.
Pillsbury Co.,253 Pillsbury officials told employees that their company
email was confidential and would not be intercepted to be used
against employees.254 An employee exchanged emails with his
supervisor, and those emails were intercepted by the company,
despite the company’s statements to the contrary, and then used as
the reason to fire the employee.255 The court held that the employee

243. No. A09-2355, 2010 WL 4721331 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010).
244. Id. at *8.
245. Id. at *1.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at *6.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *8.
252. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that
employees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in company email); Restuccia
v. Burk Tech., Inc., No. 952125, 1996 WL 1329386, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1996)
(holding that employees can have a right of privacy in company email).
253. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
254. Id. at 98.
255. Id. at 98–99.
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had no intrusion claim against Pillsbury because the employee did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of email sent
over a company email system and because the interception of the
emails was not a highly offensive intrusion into the employee’s
seclusion.256
Some courts have held that whether a highly offensive intrusion
occurs turns on the employer’s motives for searching an employee’s
email. For example, in Sitton v. Print Direction, Inc.,257 the court held
that because an employer suspected the employee of using his work
computer to conduct competing business, the employer’s search of
the employee’s emails “did not constitute such an unreasonable
intrusion as to rise to the level of invasion of privacy.”258
Cases like Smyth and Sitton notwithstanding, other courts have
not foreclosed the possibility that, under certain factual scenarios, an
employee may have a valid expectation of privacy in her email. In
Restuccia v. Burk Technology, Inc.,259 supervisors had access to
employees’ computer files, including their backed-up email messages,
but employees were never alerted to this access.260 Two employees
exchanged disparaging emails regarding their supervisor.261 The
supervisor read the emails by accessing the employees backed-up
computer files and then terminated the employees’ employment.262
The employees filed a lawsuit against the employer for invasion of
privacy.263 The court rejected the employer’s motion for summary
judgment, stating that “a genuine dispute of material fact remains on
the invasion of privacy issues,” thus establishing that the employees
could, under the right facts, prevail.264
Still other courts have held that employees have rights of privacy
from their employers while using the employers’ property. In K-Mart
256. Id. at 101. The same result has been reached in other cases. See, e.g., Miller v.
Blattner, 676 F. Supp. 2d 485, 497 (E.D. La. 2009); Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., No. 1:00-CV-12143, 2002 WL 974676, at *2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002); Battenfield v.
Harvard Univ., No. 915089F, 1993 WL 818920, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 1993);
McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App.
May 28, 1999).
257. 718 S.E. 2d 532 (Ga. App. 2011).
258. Id. at 537.
259. No. 952125, 1996 WL 1329386 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1996).
260. Id.at *1.
261. Id. The emails created nicknames for the supervisor and commented on his extramarital affair with another employee. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See id. at *3.
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Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti,265 the employee had been given a
locker at the K-Mart where she worked for the purposes of storing
her personal effects.266 With K-Mart’s consent, the employee placed
her own lock on the locker.267 After the store manager removed the
employee’s lock and searched the employee’s locker, the employee
filed an intrusion lawsuit against K-Mart.268 In upholding the jury’s
determination that K-Mart had intruded upon the employee’s
seclusion, the Trotti court stated that because the employee supplied
her own lock with K-Mart’s permission, the jury was “justified in
concluding that the employee manifested, and the employer
recognized, an expectation that the locker and its contents would be
free from intrusion and interference.”269
Employee privacy cases highlight the topical and complex nature
of privacy disputes. Thus far, courts have not reached uniformity on
issues such as whether employees have a reasonable expectation of
privacy at work or whether an employer’s search of an employee’s
email is a highly offensive intrusion. Be that as it may, courts have
made clear that employees can, under the right fact patterns, have a
right of privacy in property owned by their employers. Given that
employees typically lack any ownership interest in the property they
are seeking to keep private, it stands to reason that spouses in
community property regimes would have greater rights of privacy in
community property than employees have in their employers’
property because spouses have an actual ownership interest in the
community property in question whereas employees do not.
B.

Privacy and Management

A further wrinkle in determining what rights of privacy spouses
have in community property regimes is the managerial schemes that
apply to community property. In all community property
jurisdictions, there are three forms of management for community
property: sole management, joint management, and equal
management. Equal and joint managerial systems may, based on their
nature, tend toward holding that spouses have lesser rights of privacy,

265. 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
266. Id. at 634.
267. Id. at 634–35.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 637. For similar results relating to email accounts, see Alexander v. City of
Greensboro, 762 F. Supp. 2d 764, 811–18 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
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while sole managerial systems may tend toward reaching the opposite
conclusion.
1. Equal or Joint Management
Equal management is the default management regime in
community property jurisdictions.270 Under equal management, either
spouse may manage the community property without obtaining
consent from the other spouse.271 Managerial decisions that may be
made under equal management include decisions such as to alienate,
encumber, and lease the property. Thus, a spouse who has equal
management over community property like a diary may sell the diary
without first obtaining the consent of the other spouse.
The advantage of equal management is that it facilitates
transactions involving community property.272 If spouses had to
consult with one another every time groceries needed to be purchased
because community funds were being used, transactions involving
community property would prove prohibitively inefficient.
The disadvantage of equal management is that it also facilitates a
race between spouses to manage community property273: “if one
spouses wants to sell an item of community property and the other
does not, the spouse wishing to sell cannot be stopped” under an
equal management regime.274
While equal management gives either spouse authority over
community property, under joint management, each spouse must
consent on all managerial decisions.275 The goal of joint management
is to provide spouses with maximum protection.276 Accordingly,
community property subject to joint management traditionally
includes the more valuable items a couple might own, such as real

270. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.)
(establishing that spouses have equal management over community property); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 1100 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. laws); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131
(Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary Sess.) (providing for equal management unless
otherwise provided by law).
271. REPPY ET AL., supra note 182, at 255–56.
272. Oldham, supra note 6, at 114.
273. REPPY ET AL., supra note 182, at 179–80.
274. Oldham, supra note 6, at 114.
275. See, e.g., King v. Uhlmann, 437 P.2d 928, 941–42 (Ariz. 1968) (en banc); Dynan v.
Gallinatti, 197 P.2d 391, 391–93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Klaas v. Haueter, 745 P.2d 870, 872–
73 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
276. Oldham, supra note 6, at 107.
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property.277 For these forms of property, the law seeks to protect the
spouses by prohibiting one spouse from selling the property out from
under the other.278 Household furnishings similarly fall under the
category of joint management.279 In these situations, the law seems to
view protecting spouses’ interests in community property as more
important than encouraging efficient transactions.
Donations to third parties are also generally subject to joint
management for similar protective reasons.280 If a spouse donates
community property, the community receives nothing in return.
Applying a joint management system to donations protects the nondonor spouse from losing community property without receiving any
compensation. For the sake of efficiency, however, donations that are
reasonable and within the spouse’s economic position are typically
not subject to joint management.281 Spouses need not seek each
other’s permission to give items like birthday gifts, provided the gift is
commensurate with the financial position of the spouses.282
While equal management and joint management are in many
ways opposite—one gives spouses free reign over community
property, one requires that spouses act together when making
decisions about community property—equal and joint managerial

277. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(C) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess.);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. laws); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2347 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 123.230(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2016 Spec. Sess.); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-3-13(A) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
278. Oldham, supra note 6, at 107.
279. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230(5) (Westlaw); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2347(A) (Westlaw).
280. See generally Ballinger v. Ballinger, 70 P.2d 629 (Cal. 1937) (holding that a
husband gifting his wife community property results in the land being her property);
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr., 206 P.3d 481 (Idaho 2009)
(holding that an asset that is community property cannot be given away without partner’s
consent); In re Succession of Wagner, 993 So. 2d 709 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that
donation of gold coins was invalid without mother’s consent).
281. See Schindler v. Schindler, 131 So. 3d 439, 444 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that
wife’s consent was not needed for gifting proceeds from donations of certain municipal
bonds); Ackel v. Ackel, 595 So. 2d 739, 742 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that certain
statutes allow for the gifting of property without consent of spouse); Khalsa v. Puri, 344
P.3d 1036, 1038, 1047 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (defining factors that allow for gifting of
community property without spousal consent); Smitheal v. Smith, 31 S.W. 422, 424 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1895) (stating that particular jury instructions were fair regarding reasonableness
of gift without wife’s consent).
282. See ANDREA CARROLL & RICHARD D. MORENO, 16 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE,
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES, § 5:14, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2016) (stating that
there is an implied consent in simple gifts like these).
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schemes have an important similarity for the purposes of determining
the intra-spousal rights of privacy: each management system provides
each spouse with some degree of managerial authority over
community property.
Asserting a right of privacy in community property from a spouse
that has managerial authority over that property is difficult. Consider
the hypothetical of the diary subject to equal management. A nonauthoring spouse has authority to sell the diary. If the non-authoring
spouse has the authority to sell the diary, it would be a challenge to
assert the non-authoring spouse did not also have lesser rights in the
diary, such as the right to access the diary or to read the diary. As
Justice Holmes famously wrote, “[e]ven in the law the whole
generally includes its parts.”283
Moreover, if the non-authoring spouse exercised his equal
managerial rights and sold the diary, the buyer of the diary, as the
diary’s new owner, would certainly have the right to read the diary. If
the non-authoring spouse can, as the seller, transfer the right to read
the diary to the buyer, the non-authoring spouse must also have the
right to read the diary.284
2. Sole Management
The third form of management over community property is sole
management. The spouse with sole managerial authority has the right
to make decisions regarding community property without obtaining

283. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910). The law
routinely holds that greater authority must include lesser authority. See, e.g., Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 433 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (reasoning that the power to exclude members necessarily
included the power to include members subject to regulation); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345–46 (1986) (holding that if the state has the greater
ability to ban gambling it must have the lesser ability to ban gambling advertisements);
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (holding that if Congress can regulate the
entirety of the natural gas field, Congress has the lesser authority to allow states to
regulate the natural gas field provided states comply with federal regulations); Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923) (noting that an essential feature of the greater right of
ownership is the lesser rights of use, lease, and disposition); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
U.S. 43, 48 (1897) (stating that the greater authority to exclude must include the lesser
authority to include subject to conditions).
284. This example is an application of the basic principle nemo dat quod non habet. See
Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 550 (1872) (defining nemo dat quod non habet as the
principle that no one “can sell personal property and convey a valid title to it unless he is
the owner or lawfully represents the owner”).

95 N.C. L. REV. 729 (2017)

2017]

COMMUNITY PROPERTY & PRIVACY LAW

775

the consent of the other spouse.285 As the name implies, only one
spouse can have sole managerial authority; the other spouse has no
decision-making authority over the community property.286
Sole management, like equal management, has a certain
efficiency in its operation. One spouse has the authority to make all
decisions with regards to the community property, thereby removing
the potentially inefficient requirement of obtaining both spouses’
consent.287 Sole management is not without problems, however. The
non-managing spouse retains an ownership interest in property, but
has no authority to exercise any control over that ownership interest,
thus leading to possible conflict if the non-managing spouse disagrees
with the actions taken by the managing spouse.288 In such a situation,
the non-managing spouse has no recourse.289
Sole management applies to very limited forms of property. For
example, registered personal property, such as automobiles, and the
personal property of a business that is solely managed by one spouse
are subject to sole management.290 If a car is registered in one
spouse’s name, that spouse has sole managerial authority over the car
and may sell the car without first consulting the other spouse. Both
spouses have an ownership interest in the car, but only the spouse in
whose name the car is registered has the authority to make
managerial decisions with regards to the car.
Some scholars have argued that privity of contract applies to
community property, thereby subjecting contracts entered into by one
spouse to the sole management of that spouse.291 While some cases
support a privity of contract theory,292 many cases do not.293 For
285. REPPY ET AL., supra note 182, at 256 (noting that states have created sole
management exceptions to equal management).
286. Id.
287. Oldham, supra note 6, at 113 (“The sole management system facilitates
transactions for the family.”).
288. Id.
289. See id. at 113–14.
290. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(a)(1), (b) (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.) (highlighting instances in which sole management arises, such as individual
earnings provided that such earnings are not mixed with other community property);
Oldham, supra note 6, at 112–14, 122–25.
291. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346, cmt. b (Westlaw through 2016 2d
Extraordinary Sess.); Lee Hargrave, Community Property Interests in Individual
Retirement Accounts, 55 LA. L. REV. 509, 511–12 (1995).
292. See, e.g., Canale v. Gus Mayer, 481 So. 2d 170 (La Ct. App. 1985). In Canale, a
wife brought a community property fur coat to a department store for storage purposes.
Id. at 170–71. The department store gave the wife a claim ticket with which to retrieve her
coat in the future. Id. at 171. The husband called the department store and had the coat
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example, in Brown v. Boeing Co.,294 the Washington appellate court
implied that a non-employee spouse could exercise management over
an employee-spouse’s pension, thus implying the pension was subject
to equal, not sole, management.295
To the extent that community property is subject to sole
management, arguably the sole managing spouse should have a right
of privacy in that property. The non-managing spouse has no
managerial rights in the property. Having no managerial rights may
be interpreted as meaning the non-managing spouse does not have a
right to access the community property. If that is the case, the
managing spouse may have a right of privacy in solely managed
community property.
The difficulty in resting intra-spousal privacy rights in community
property is two-fold. First, many types of property in which a spouse
might want a right of privacy, like a diary, are not subject to sole
management. This is particularly true if privity of contract does not
apply to community property.296
delivered to him. Id. When the wife returned to the department store, the coat was no
longer there. Id. The wife successfully sued the department store for breach of contract
because it returned the coat to her husband and not to her. Id. at 170–71. The appellate
court ruled in favor of the wife, holding that the department store and the wife had a
contract of deposit with one another and that the husband could not manage that contract.
Id. at 172.
293. See, e.g., Johns v. Retirement Fund Tr., 149 Cal. Rptr. 551, 551 (Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that a non-employee spouse “has as much right to manage and control the
community property” as the employee spouse).
294. 622 P.2d 1313 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
295. Id. at 1315–17. In Brown, the employee-spouse elected to receive his pension
payouts as straight-life method payments as opposed to joint and survivor payments. Id. at
1315. By receiving pension payments through the straight-line method, the individual
payments were higher than they would have been under the joint and survivor system, but
the payments terminated at the death of the employee. Id. The employee-spouse told his
non-employee spouse of his election and the non-employee spouse objected, but never
contacted the employer. Id. at 1316. The employee-spouse passed away two months after
his retirement. Id. The non-employee spouse sued the employer, asserting that the
deceased employee-spouse violated his fiduciary duties to act in the best interest of the
spouses when he elected the straight-life method for pension payments. Id.
In holding for the employer, the Brown court noted that, under Washington law,
either spouse had the authority to manage the pension because the pension did not fall
under any of the statutorily provided pieces of property subject to dual or sole
management. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the non-employee spouse could have
contacted the employer, presumably to alter the pension payout method. Id. at 1315, 1317.
Conclusions like that in Brown cut against the theory that privity of contract applies to
community property, such that contractual arrangements are subject to the sole
management of the contracting spouse.
296. If, as some scholars have argued, privity of contract applies to community
property, then property like an email account may be subject to sole management because
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Second, regardless of the managerial scheme, community
property is still jointly owned. Even under a sole management regime,
all of the aforementioned issues regarding what rights joint owners of
property have in that property still remain. Sole management could
be interpreted to mean the managing spouse has a right of privacy in
the community property, and thus the ability to exclude the other
spouse from that property, but courts have not thus far interpreted
sole management in such a manner. Admittedly, courts have not been
faced with the issue of whether a non-managing spouse can be
excluded from accessing solely managed community property. Courts
could reach such a conclusion, but could also just as easily conclude
the opposite.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD FOR COMMUNITY PROPERTY
JURISDICTIONS
When community property and privacy law intersect, ambiguities
abound. There is extensive uncertainty surrounding what rights of
privacy spouses in community property jurisdictions have vis-à-vis
one another with regard to community property.
For many spouses, and perhaps even most, that lack of clarity
may never matter. According to a 2014 Pew Research Center study,
sixty-seven percent of Internet users in a married or committed
relationship have shared the password to one or more of their online
accounts with their spouse or partner.297 In a perfect marriage, both
spouses might be so open with one another that they do not desire
keeping anything private. Or perhaps in a utopian world, spouses
might be so trusting and respectful of one another that they would
always honor any desire the other spouse had for privacy.

one spouse contracts with the email provider when creating the account. See Richardson,
Classifying Virtual Property, supra note 15, at 754–55 (discussing how email accounts are
registered); Richardson, How Community Property Jurisdictions, supra note 26, at 111–15
(2011) (discussing the management of Twitter accounts).
297. AMANDA LENHART & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., COUPLES, THE
INTERNET, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 2 (2014). A New York Times column in January 2016
highlighted that many spouses are “No Secrets[,]” meaning they allow one another to read
each other’s emails, texts, etc. Philip Galanes, Social Q’s: She Asked for Cash, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2016, at ST8. The twenty-first century equivalent of giving your high school
sweetheart your letter jacket is to give her—or him—the password to your social media
networks. See Matt Richtel, Young, in Love and Sharing Everything, Including a
Password, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A1.
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In the real world, marriages are not perfect. Spouses snoop.
Wives hack into email accounts. Husbands make secret recordings.
Rights of privacy, assuming they exist, are regularly violated.
Delineating the line between community property and privacy
law must be done because this distinction can have great legal and
practical consequences. Whether a spouse can successfully sue for
intrusion upon seclusion, violation of the ECPA, or any other
privacy-protecting statute turns on identifying the exact scope of a
spouse’s privacy in community property.
The intersection of privacy and community property law also
matters for evidentiary purposes. Evidence obtained in violation of
the ECPA, as well as evidence derived from information obtained in
violation of the ECPA, is inadmissible in all trials, hearings, and
proceedings.298 California has specifically legislated that in divorce
hearings, evidence collected by eavesdropping is inadmissible.299 If
spouses have no rights of privacy in community property, then
spouses cannot violate the ECPA or any evidence-barring state
statutes because the thing being intercepted is community property.
Of course, determining where community property law ends and
privacy law begins may be putting the cart before the horse. First, a
normative decision must be made on the question of whether spouses
in community property jurisdictions should retain a right of privacy
upon entering marriage. Only if that question is answered in the
affirmative must jurisdictions clarify the extent of a spouse’s right of
privacy within a community property regime.
A. Should Spouses in Community Property Jurisdictions Retain a
Right of Privacy?
Unlike the common law, community property law has always
viewed spouses as two separate individuals.300 As the Texas Supreme
Court stated in the mid-1800s in response to the assertion that
spouses morphed into one upon marriage, “[h]usband and wife are
not one under our laws. The existence of a wife is not merged in that

298. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012). Evidence obtained by intruding upon the seclusion of a
spouse is, however, usually admissible, as the common law privacy tort does not have a
built-in exclusionary rule. See Turkington, supra note 162, at 736–37. Similarly, there is no
exclusionary rule included in the Stored Communications Act.
299. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2022(a) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. laws).
300. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHAN, supra note 183, § 2, at 3–4.

95 N.C. L. REV. 729 (2017)

2017]

COMMUNITY PROPERTY & PRIVACY LAW

779

of the husband. Most certainly is this true so far as the rights of
property are concerned.”301
Given community property’s history in viewing spouses as
separate individuals, it seems only natural that community property
jurisdictions would find that spouses retain their separate rights of
privacy.302 American courts reached this conclusion in part because of
the shift from viewing spouses as one individual to considering
spouses as separate people.303 As community property law has always
held the position that spouses are distinct individuals, it follows
logically that community property jurisdictions would also adopt the
view that spouses maintain their separate rights of privacy after
entering marriage.
Currently, some community property jurisdictions appear to be
in favor of holding that spouses maintain a right of privacy.304 In
Clayton v. Richards,305 a Texas appellate court recognized that a wife
intruded upon the seclusion of her husband by, without his
knowledge, videotaping him in their bedroom and opening his mail.306
No community property interest in the bedroom or mail was asserted,
and therefore the court did not inquire as to whether the husband had
a right of privacy.307 Thus, the Clayton court made no statement
regarding the interplay of community property law and privacy law.
The court did, however, make a strong statement about the right of
privacy afforded to spouses:
As a spouse with equal rights to the use and access of the
bedroom, it would not be illegal or tortious as an invasion of
privacy for a spouse to open the door of the bedroom and view
a spouse in bed. It could be argued that a spouse did no more
than that by setting up a video camera, but that the viewing was
301. Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 13, 19–20 (1851).
302. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHAN, supra note 183, § 2, at 5 & n.17; Michael J. Vaughn,
The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV.
20, 34 (1967) (stating that community property’s “cardinal principles are based upon the
separate identity of each spouse”).
303. See supra Part II.
304. See, e.g., Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). Of course,
not all courts have held that spouses retain a right of privacy in community property; in
fact, as previously noted, some have reached the contrary conclusion. See Hennig v. Alltel
Commc’ns, Inc., 903 So. 2d 1137, 1141 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Tooley v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617, 618–619 (La. Ct. App. 1963); see also supra Section
III.A.1.
305. 47 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
306. Id. at 154–55.
307. Id. at 155.

95 N.C. L. REV. 729 (2017)

780

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

done by means of technology rather than by being physically
present. It is not generally the role of the courts to supervise
privacy between spouses in a mutually shared bedroom.
However, the videotaping of a person without consent or
awareness when there is an expectation of privacy goes beyond
the rights of a spouse because it may record private matters,
which could later be exposed to the public eye. The fact that no
later exposure occurs does not negate that potential and permit
willful intrusion by such technological means into one’s
personal life in one’s bedroom.308
Though the Clayton court did not contemplate how community
property laws might impact the husband’s right of privacy, the court’s
rationale provides strong support for concluding that spouses retain at
least some rights of privacy even within the community property
regime.
Moreover, since non-community property jurisdictions have
held, almost unanimously, that spouses have a right of privacy, it
likely behooves community property jurisdictions to reach the same
conclusion. Community property states like California, Texas, and
Louisiana, would certainly not desire discouraging spouses from
settling in their jurisdiction.309 Granting fewer privacy protections to
spouses in community property jurisdictions could have that effect.
Marriage, as previously noted, is viewed as an important
institution in the United States. Given the importance placed on
marriage, it seems that married individuals should receive, at a
minimum, the same protections against one another as unmarried
individuals. There is no question as to whether unmarried individuals
have a right of privacy from one another. As marriage is viewed as an
important institution, it would be illogical to grant married individuals
lesser protections than unmarried individuals.310

308. Id. at 155–56.
309. See 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 3 (2016) (“Public policy favors the institution of
marriage . . . . The state has a vital interest in the marriage relation, and it is the public
policy to foster and promote the marriage relationship or institution of marriage.”).
310. By its nature, marriage involves compromises and, arguably, sacrifices on the part
of both spouses. That spouses might give up some of their rights of privacy is not
surprising. Cases like White v. White, 781 A.2d 85, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001),
highlight this by recognizing that a spouse’s right of privacy to property that both spouses
regularly use is less than a spouse’s right of privacy would be to property that only one
spouse uses, id. at 92. The point here is that spouses living together should have the same
rights of privacy vis-à-vis one another as non-married individuals living together.
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Similarly, courts have held that individuals who lack an
ownership interest in property, like employees, can have rights of
privacy in property owned by others.311 It is counterintuitive to grant
an owner of property fewer privacy protections than a non-owner of
that property would have. Spouses with an ownership interest in
community property should have as much, if not more, privacy rights
than someone like an employee, who has no ownership interest in his
employer’s property.
While history, modern jurisprudence, and policy considerations
seem to encourage courts and lawmakers to conclude that spouses in
community property jurisdictions have a right of privacy from one
another, arguments against finding a right of privacy certainly exist.
Reading the jurisprudence regarding intra-spousal privacy may
lead to questions regarding what a right of privacy is really protecting.
The vast majority of cases in which intra-spousal privacy claims have
been raised involve one spouse thinking, correctly or incorrectly, that
the other spouse is committing adultery.312 While a spying spouse may
desire evidence of the other spouse having an extramarital affair for
any number of health and safety reasons,313 the common use of such
information is, as previously stated, for leverage in custody and
spousal support disputes.314 Some may argue that spouses should have
a right to obtain evidence of adultery by any means because of the
impact it may have on custody and spousal support litigation.
Furthermore, in at least some other areas of the law, it has been
stated that adultery is not protected under privacy law.315
311. See supra Section III.A.3.
312. See, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 804–05 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled by
Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2003); Miller v. Meyers, 766 F. Supp. 2d 919,
924–25 (W.D. Ark. 2011); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005);
In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Iowa 2008); People v. Walker, 813 N.W.2d
750, 750–51 (Mich. 2012) (mem.); State v. Hormann, 805 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. Ct. App.
2011); White v. White, 781 A.2d 85, 91–92 (N.J. 2001); Byrne v. Byrne, 650 N.Y.S.2d 499,
500 (Sup. Ct. 1996); Miller v. Brooks, 123 N.C. 20, 28, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (1996); Clayton
v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
313. Jennifer Mitchell, Sex, Lies, and Spyware: Balancing the Right to Privacy Against
the Right to Know in the Marital Relationship, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 171, 183 (2007).
314. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
315. See Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1478–79 (D. Utah 1995)
(holding that a police officer who was suspended without pay due to his extramarital
affairs that occurred during non-duty hours had no right of privacy in his adultery); City of
Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 469–70 (Tex. 1996) (holding that a police officer who
was denied promotion due to his adulterous actions had no right of privacy in those
actions). But see Briggs v. N. Muskegon Police Dep’t, 563 F. Supp. 585, 590–92 (W.D.
Mich. 1983) (holding that a married police officer’s right of sexual privacy was infringed
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Accordingly, it may be argued that the law should not concern itself
with protecting a spouse’s ability to keep private evidence of adultery.
While concerns of adultery may be a catalyst, and perhaps even
the primary impetus, for many spouses to snoop, evidence of adultery
is not the only item found when a spouse’s seclusion is intruded upon.
The discovery of a spouse’s private matters is—as the Clayton court
noted—a serious concern, particularly given that the private matters
discovered can be repeated and distributed by the spying spouse to
the detriment of the spied-upon spouse.316 Though some individuals
might like an intra-spousal privacy doctrine that protects privacy
when the spied-on spouse is free of any wrongdoing, but allows for
spying when the spied-on spouse is engaged in less savory behavior,
certainly that cannot be the law. Intra-spousal privacy law, like
Fourth Amendment law, cannot and should not be crafted using an
ends-justifies-the-means formula.317
It may be argued that the very nature of community property
dictates that spouses have no rights of privacy from one another.
Community property law has been said to take a “wastebasket”
approach to property, throwing all property into the community
classification unless it falls under one of the limited instances of
separate property.318 Historically, the wastebasket approach was
taken so far as to find that damages to an individual spouse for his or
her own pain and suffering should be classified as community
property.319 If spouses want privacy, they can always opt out of the
community property regime. To the extent they do not, it may be
argued that the spirit of community property law says spouses should
have access to all property created or acquired during the marriage.
In modern times, community property jurisdictions have moved
away from the wastebasket approach. Rules regarding the
classification of damages received for pain and suffering as

upon when he was fired for living with a woman who was not his wife), aff’d unpublished
table decision, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 909 (1985).
316. Clayton, 47 S.W.3d at 153; Samantha H. Scheller, Comment, A Picture Is Worth a
Thousand Words: The Legal Implications of Revenge Porn, 93 N.C. L. REV. 551, 551
(2014) (documenting and analyzing the use of private photography and videotapes for the
purpose of exacting revenge on an ex-partner).
317. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–76 (1928) (Brandies, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
318. In re Marriage of Parsons, 622 P.2d 415, 416 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); Harry M.
Cross, The Community Property Law Revised, 61 WASH. L. REV. 13, 28 (1986) (noting the
historical use of the wastebasket approach).
319. E.g., Zaragosa v. Craven, 202 P.2d 73, 76–77 (Cal. 1949) (en banc).

95 N.C. L. REV. 729 (2017)

2017]

COMMUNITY PROPERTY & PRIVACY LAW

783

community property have long been reversed.320 There are numerous
instances in which property created and acquired during marriage is
classified as separate property.321 Community property states easily
recognize that spouses can be in a community while still retaining a
degree of separateness in their property.322
Ultimately, the reasons for holding in favor of a right of intraspousal privacy in a community property regime outweigh those
against it. Such a conclusion places privacy claims in line with other
intra-spousal tort claims in community property jurisdictions. All
community property jurisdictions have abolished the traditional rule
of intra-spousal immunity in tort.323 There is not a strong rationale for
treating privacy rights differently than any other tort.
However, while spouses in community property regimes should
have rights of privacy vis-à-vis one another, those rights must take
into account the rights of the other spouse who also has an ownership
interest in the property. Just as it cannot be the rule that one spouse
has no recourse against the other for secretly videotaping her because
of community property law, it similarly cannot be the rule that one
spouse can hide financially valuable assets from the other because of
privacy law.
B.

Altering the Community Property Regime to Protect Privacy

Given that joint ownership and management of community
property are the primary differences between community and
separate property regimes, to undo these parts of community
property may be considered a dismantling of the entire institution.
Thus, some may assert that the best solution to the intra-spousal
privacy problem is to do away with community property altogether.
That drastic solution throws the baby out with the bathwater.
There are arguably many benefits created by community property
law.324 As has been noted, community property law is advantageous at
320. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.);
Soto v. Vandeventer, 245 P.2d 826, 832 (N.M. 1952); Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207, 1212
(Wash. 1984) (en banc).
321. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text.
322. Id.
323. See REPPY ET AL., supra note 182, at 233.
324. See, e.g., David W. Reinecke, Community Property Issues for Noncommunity
Property Practitioners, 28 ACTEC J. 224, 233–35 (2002) (discussing tax and fairness
advantages for community property jurisdictions). But see Andrea B. Carroll, The
Superior Position of the Creditor in the Community Property Regime: Has the Community
Become a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 2 (2007)
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death, for in separate property jurisdictions, sophisticated individuals
can plan around probate devices like the elective share that work to
divide property equitably between spouses.325 Community property
law can also serve as an equalizer between the spouses because it
generally allows for equal ownership of property acquired while
married, regardless of which spouse specifically earned the
property.326 Historically, this has primarily benefitted women, given
that women were less likely than men to be the primary financial
provider for the family.327 Regardless of the gender of the spouses,
community property has an equalizing effect for the nonbreadwinning spouse.
Assuming community property jurisdictions view community
property law as beneficial and wish to retain it while also protecting
intra-spousal privacy rights, then jurisdictions must take a hard look
at how their current laws can be amended to adequately protect intraspousal privacy rights.
Some of the most egregious examples of spousal spying, such as
spouses secretly videotaping one another, may already be protected
against under the constitutional theory that the right to bodily
autonomy is among the penumbra of rights of privacy.328 If the court
recognizes that a spouse secretly records the other and state
community property law is such that the videotaped spouse has no
legal remedy, then the court might strike down the application of
community property law. That a court would reach such a conclusion
is far from certain.
(arguing that community property is primarily advantageous for creditors, not the spouses
themselves).
325. Turnipseed, supra note 197, at 177–82.
326. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(c) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg.
Sess.).
327. Vaughn, supra note 302, at 38–41. Moreover, to the extent that women receive
less pay than men even today, community property law can still be an equalizer between
opposite sexes in a marriage. See NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, FIFTY YEARS AFTER
THE EQUAL PAY ACT: ASSESSING THE PAST, TAKING STOCK OF THE FUTURE 6–7
(2013).
328. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Griswold, Justice
William Douglas described the constitutional rights of privacy protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment as a “penumbral rights of privacy and repose.” Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (citing Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,
626 (1951), abrogated by Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620
(1980)). Bodily autonomy has been held to be part of that penumbra. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (holding the right of privacy included the right for a woman to
decide whether to have an abortion, though that right may be reasonably qualified by
legislation).
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Similarly, the federal ECPA may preempt the application of
state community property law with regard to intercepted electronic
communications. Modern federal courts have held that the ECPA
applies to spouses.329 To the extent that state community property law
requires the ECPA to exclude spouses, then state community
property law may be preempted. Federal courts have not hesitated to
preempt other areas of community property law,330 so there is no
reason to think federal courts would not preempt the application of
state community property with regards to the ECPA.
Though current privacy laws may protect some aspects of intraspousal privacy in community property jurisdictions,331 they do not
protect everything. Community property jurisdictions must still
consider modifying ownership and management rules to ensure
spouses maintain their individual rights of privacy.
1. Change Ownership Rules
Joint ownership of community property is, arguably, at the root
of the intra-spousal privacy problem for community property
jurisdictions. Accordingly, joint ownership rules could be altered to
protect a spouse’s right of privacy.
One means by which community property ownership could be
modified to protect privacy rights would be to find that intellectual
property rights are not subject to community property law. Numerous
scholars have previously argued that intellectual property rights
should not be subject to community property law,332 and the privacy
issues raised herein may strengthen those arguments. Making

329. E.g., Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), writ denied per
curiam, 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1996).
330. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 834 (1997) (holding that ERISA preempts the
application of state community at death); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235–36
(1981) (holding that federal law pertaining to military retirement pay preempts the
application of state community property law); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,
590–91 (1979) (holding that the Railroad Retirement Act preempts the application of state
community property law); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1964) (holding that
federal statutes pertaining to United States savings bonds preempts the application of
state community property law); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669 (1962) (same).
331. See, e.g., King v. Uhlmann, 437 P.2d 928, 941–42 (Ariz. 1968) (en banc).
332. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property, 60 LA.
L. REV. 127, 128 (1999); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community
Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153, 155–56 (1995); David Nimmer, Copyright
Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L. REV. 383, 385
(1988); Debora Polacheck, Note, The “Un-Worth-Y” Decision: The Characterization of a
Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601, 603 (1995).
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intellectual property rights separate property would potentially have
the benefit of protecting material subject to copyright, like the
content of email or diaries, from the prying eyes of a non-authoring
spouse.
The difficulties with carving out intellectual property rights from
community law are three-fold. First, it is unclear that making
intellectual property rights separate property would have any impact
on the ownership of the thing the intellectual property right protects.
For example, in Rodrigue v. Rodrigue,333 the Fifth Circuit held that
the copyright to particular paintings was subject to community
property law and, within community property law, under the sole
management of the artist-husband.334 However, that result had no
bearing as to who had managerial control over the paintings
themselves. Similarly, even if a copyright (or other intellectual
property right) is the separate property of one spouse, that does not
mean the work underlying the copyright would also be the separate
property of that spouse.
Second, even if carving out intellectual property rights provides a
greater right of privacy in certain forms of community property, there
are other forms of property in which privacy issues arise that are not
covered by intellectual property. The alarm clock in Tigges in which
the husband inserted a pinpoint camera is such an example.335 Making
intellectual property rights separate property does nothing to protect
against the altered community property alarm clock sitting in the
community property house.
Third, there is a downside to making intellectual property rights
separate. Intellectual property rights can be very fruitful financially.
The profits generated by the intellectual property rights, to the extent
they are attributable to the labor of a spouse during marriage, should
be classified as community property. If intellectual property rights are
classified as separate property, then under some community property
jurisdictions, those profits would not fall under the community
umbrella. Given these difficulties, changing community property
ownership law to carve out intellectual property is an unsatisfactory
approach.
Another approach to altering community property ownership
law is to utilize Neil Richards’s understanding of “intellectual
333. 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000).
334. Id. at 442–43.
335. In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Iowa 2008).
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privacy” and find there is no community ownership in items that fall
under the intellectual privacy rubric.336 Richards argues that
[i]nformation relating to intellectual activity is increasingly
being created, tracked, and maintained by government and
private entities. Such information practices have conventionally
been thought of as raising privacy concerns, but privacy has
frequently failed to stand up to the countervailing interests that
have been arrayed against it.337
Accordingly, Richards has developed a theory of intellectual
privacy that establishes four freedoms that should be protected:
freedom of thought and belief, freedom of intellectual activity and
private spaces, freedom of private intellectual exploration, and
freedom of confidential communications.338 Richards argues that
constitutional doctrine and state laws could be used to protect some
of these areas of intellectual privacy.339 He suggests, for example, that
Fourth Amendment warrant requirements could be imposed in order
for the government to obtain “intellectual records” from third parties,
such as book purchases and search engine queries.340 Similarly,
Richards states that communications could be protected by
“(1) preventing interception of . . . communications by third parties
and (2) sometimes also preventing betrayal of confidences
by . . . confidants.”341
While Richards’s theory of intellectual privacy does not perfectly
overlay community property law, it could be used as a foundation for
reconsidering rules of community property ownership. To the extent
that intellectual activity, thoughts, and confidential communications
are considered property, and thus could be classified as community
property, jurisdictions might consider placing these items of
intellectual privacy into the separate property classification. The
private thoughts a spouse included in a diary would be considered the
spouse’s separate property because they are part of the spouse’s
intellectual privacy.

336. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 426 (2008)
(arguing that intellectual property serves a vital function in the furtherance of the ultimate
realization of First Amendment rights).
337. Id. at 427.
338. Id. at 408–25.
339. Id. at 431.
340. Id. at 439.
341. Id. at 422 (emphasis removed).
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The difficulty in applying the intellectual privacy theory is
drawing the line between when a thought or communication should
fall under the classification of intellectual privacy and when that same
thought or communication has moved beyond a private one and into
a public one such that it should be classified as community
property.342 For example, assume a spouse, while married, begins to
develop an idea for a book, but the idea is not fully fleshed out, the
characters are not developed, and the setting is not even chosen.
Divorce occurs and thereafter the spouse with the book idea writes
the book she began to develop while married.343 Under community
property law, to the extent the authoring spouse exerted any labor on
the book while married, some portion of the book (and its profits) is
classified as community property. Under an intellectual privacy
theory, the result might differ. If the development of the book while
the spouses were married was considered the intellectual privacy of
the authoring spouse, and those ideas did not become part of the
public domain until after divorce, then there would be no community
interest in the book.
Using Richards’s theory may not perfectly capture or govern all
of the items spouses wish to keep private during a marriage.
Richards’s theory has the benefit, though, of providing a starting
point for reconsidering community property ownership law because it
addresses some of those items that spouses might reasonably desire to
keep private.344 Additionally, Richards’s theory builds in a level of
necessary flexibility, as he acknowledges that “some accommodation
of competing interests must necessarily take place.”345
2. Change Management Rules
Some jurisdictions may, perhaps wisely, exhibit reticence to
change community property ownership laws given the potentially vast

342. See id. at 422. Richards describes the notion of a communication as private when it
is not ready for “prime time[.]” Id. Accordingly, an idea that is in the public, or prime
time, would ostensibly not be considered part of one’s intellectual privacy. Id.
343. This fact pattern is akin to the facts of Michel v. Michel, 484 So. 2d 829, 833–34
(La. Ct. App. 1986).
344. Richards’s goal is to keep thoughts private, even when those thoughts take on a
tangible form. See Richards, supra note 336, at 388–89. Much of the community property
that a spouse may wish to keep private can be described as the thoughts of that spouse
that have taken a tangible form.
345. Id. at 408.
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unintended consequences that may accompany such changes. A more
surgical approach may thus be desired.346
Jurisdictions could instead opt to alter management rules.
Altering management rules would have the benefit of not making it
easier to classify property as separate and thus thwart the community
property system. If jurisdictions so chose, there are a number of
options for how management rules could be amended to reflect intraspousal privacy rights.
First, as previously noted, courts might interpret sole
management as providing an intra-spousal right of privacy.347 That
interpretation would not be a difficult stretch for courts; however, to
date, no court has reached that decision. It would require courts to
acknowledge that spouses with an ownership interest in community
property can be excluded from that property, thereby making the
joint ownership found in community property different from other
jointly held property rights where joint interest holders cannot be
excluded.
For jurisdictions concerned about whether courts will interpret
sole management as providing a right of privacy, legislatures could
amend sole management statutes to clearly provide that sole
management includes the right to exclude the non-managing spouse
from the community property. In doing so, legislatures must be
cautious to exclude the non-managing spouse only from using or
accessing the property, not from any financial benefits that may flow
from the property.
Assuming sole management is interpreted to provide a right of
privacy for one spouse, jurisdictions have alternatives as to how to
bring more property under the sole management umbrella. One
possibility is to make it easier for spouses to convert property that
would otherwise be subject to equal management or joint
management to property subject to sole management. While all
community property jurisdictions allow spouses to contractually opt
out of the community property regime, only two states—Louisiana
and Texas—explicitly allow spouses to alter the managerial regime
that applies to community property.348 Louisiana requires that this
346. As courts have said, there is no need to use a butcher knife when a scalpel will
suffice. See, e.g., Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 315 (1st Cir. 2001).
347. See supra Section III.B.2.
348. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2348 (Westlaw through 2016 2d Extraordinary Sess.)
(allowing spouses to renounce their right to concur in managerial decisions for property
subject to joint management); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(c) (West, Westlaw through
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alteration be done expressly, and, to the extent the alteration
concerns real property, be done in writing.349 At least one Texas court
has allowed for oral agreements to serve as an agreement modifying
the managerial scheme applied to community property.350
If sole management is interpreted as providing a right of privacy
for one spouse, then jurisdictions could follow the Louisiana and
Texas models and allow for spouses to contract around the default
managerial rules.351 This would allow spouses to agree that certain
forms of property otherwise subject to equal management, such as the
hypothetical diary previously mentioned, would be subject to sole
management. The form requirements that jurisdictions establish, or
do not establish, would determine the ease with which spouses could
enter into such management-altering agreements.
A second possibility would be to increase the types of property
subject to sole management. Privity of contract, for example, could be
incorporated in the types of community property rights subject to sole
management. That would allow for any property created under a
contract between one spouse and a third party to be subject to the
sole management of the contracting spouse. This would mirror, to
some extent, the current registration rule for movable property.
Property registered in one spouse’s name alone is subject to sole
management. Similarly, property contracted for by one spouse alone
could be subject to sole management. The effect for privacy rights
would be that property like email accounts and Facebook profiles
would clearly be subject to sole management.352
The downside with incorporating privity of contract under the
umbrella of sole management is that other properties, sometimes with
high economic values, may be roped into the sole management
scheme, too, for better or worse. Before jurisdictions decide that the
way to ensure email is protected is to codify privity of contract

2015 Reg. Sess.) (allowing for alterations in management to be made via written or other
agreement).
349. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2348 (Westlaw).
350. See LeBlanc v. Waller, 603 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). But see Owen
v. Porter, 796 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1990) (establishing that oral or implied
agreements did not meet the requirements for altering the managerial scheme over
particular community property).
351. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2348 (Westlaw); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(c)
(Westlaw).
352. Arguably, e-mail accounts should already be considered under sole management
pursuant to the registration rule. See Richardson, How Community Property Jurisdictions,
supra note 26, at 112 (discussing Twitter accounts as an example of virtual property).
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principles, jurisdictions should carefully consider whether pensions,
401(k) accounts, and similar items which are contracted for should
also be subject to sole management.
A more nuanced approach would be to provide that property
operated exclusively by one spouse or property for the exclusive
benefit of one spouse is subject to that spouse’s sole management.
That rule reflects the general principle behind placing the personal
property of a solely managed community business under the sole
management scheme—if one spouse utilizes the property, that spouse
should have managerial control over the property. This may solve the
problem of the diary or an email account, without making more
financially important properties, like a retirement account, subject to
sole management. Under this approach, if one spouse, and only one
spouse, uses an email account, the other spouse could be precluded
from reviewing that account because the account is subject to the
exclusive use of one spouse. A retirement account, however, is
arguably for the benefit and use of both spouses, and thus would not
fall under the sole management rule.
The notion of granting rights of privacy in property subject to
one spouse’s exclusive use has been used in other areas of the law,
such as Fourth Amendment law. Privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment turn, in part, on whether an individual has exclusive use
of the property. In United States v. Matlock,353 the Court examined
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment that arose when a cooccupant of a bedroom consented for the police to search the
bedroom.354 The Court held that the evidence found in the bedroom
was admissible because the consent of a party who possessed common
authority over the bedroom was sufficient under the Fourth
Amendment.355 In discussing what it meant to have “common
authority,” the Matlock Court stated that the authority rests “on

353. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
354. Id. at 177. The standard for evaluating whether a search violates an individual’s
privacy as provided by the Fourth Amendment is different than the analysis used under
tort law. The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted as creating a two-prong standard
whereby courts first examine whether the individual had a subjective expectation of
privacy, see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95–96 (1990), and second, consider whether
the expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
715 (1987). For an explanation of the common law right of privacy, see generally supra
Section II.A.
355. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171–72, 177.
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mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes.”356
The black letter law from Matlock exemplifies the type of privacy
rule community property jurisdictions could enact. Community
property states might statutorily apply sole management to
community property that is subject to the exclusive use, access, or
control by one spouse for most purposes and is for the benefit of one
spouse.357
A different approach that could be taken by legislatures or courts
would be to create a privacy exemption for certain types of
community property that are private in nature. Instead of altering
sole management rules, jurisdictions could find that some community
property is so private in nature that it should not be disclosed to the
other spouse. This is not to say the other spouse does not retain an
ownership interest in the property, but simply to say that the property
is exempt from disclosure.
Drawing the line as to what properties are so private in nature
that they should be exempt from intra-spousal disclosure will not be
easy. Though jurisdictions may codify the broad exemption rule,
courts will ultimately need to determine whether community property
is of a private nature. That determination will likely be made through
a subjective, “I know it when I see it” approach.358 Jurisdictions that
opt to create a privacy exemption for community property may want
to create some boundaries regarding what could constitute private
property. Those boundaries might include protections for the
excluded spouse. For instance, property impacting the financial
position of the spouses could be excluded under the privacy
exemption.
Creating a privacy exemption, though novel to community
property law, is not unheard of. The Freedom of Information Act

356. Id. at 171 n.7.
357. In doing so, jurisdictions may have to determine whether joint management
provisions or sole management provisions should trump. For example, if only one spouse
uses some household furnishing, such as a piano, it may be argued that the furnishing is
subject to the sole use of one spouse and for only that spouse’s benefit. Arguably the
piano is for the benefit of both spouses, but assuming it is not, then jurisdictions will have
to decide whether the piano should be subject to the joint management rule because (1) it
is a household furnishing; (2) it is subject to the sole management rule; or (3) it is an item
used by and for the benefit of only one spouse.
358. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (utilizing
the “I know it when I see it” approach).
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(“FOIA”) provides an example.359 FOIA allows for public inspection
of records held by government bodies.360 Exemption 6, the privacy
exemption, limits what must be publicly available and allows certain
documents to be withheld from public inspection if their disclosure
“would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.”361 Exemption 6 is an example of how community property
states might build a privacy protection into certain types of
community property.
A privacy exemption would serve as a means of protecting
private information from community disclosure. Alternatively, states
could create or enhance an affirmative managerial duty of spouses to
disclose pertinent information to one another. Community property
jurisdictions could follow provisions like California Family Code
section 1100(e), which requires that a spouse “make full disclosure to
the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the
existence . . . of all assets in which the community has or may have an
interest.”362 Though such provisions thus far have only required the
disclosure of financial assets,363 states could, legislatively or
jurisprudentially, interpret such provisions as requiring the
affirmative disclosure of all information that might be pertinent to the
married couple. This could include information such as adulterous
behavior, but exclude from disclosure the private, written thoughts of
one spouse which may have no material impact on the marriage, but
could cause unnecessary havoc if disclosed.
CONCLUSION
Courts in community property jurisdictions have not yet
answered the question of where community property rights end and
spousal privacy rights begin. However, courts should prioritize finding
a solution to this issue to ensure that privacy rights are protected for
spouses. This Article serves as a roadmap for how courts and
legislatures can approach the issue without dismantling the entire
community property system.
Ultimately, crafting a solution for ensuring that intra-spousal
privacy is provided in community property regimes will require states
359. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2016).
360. Id. § 552(a).
361. Id. § 552(b)(6). See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, 4 ADMIN. L. &
PRAC. § 14:62 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the privacy exemption allowed by most states).
362. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(e) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. laws).
363. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Feldman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 46–47 (Ct. App. 2007).
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individually to reflect on their pertinent statutes and jurisprudence to
determine the most surgical means of clarifying what rights spouses
have vis-à-vis one another. In doing so, states should be careful to
balance an individual spouse’s right of privacy with the other spouse’s
rights as partial owner of the community property.
In balancing the spouses’ rights of privacy and ownership,
jurisdictions might return to the oft-cited creators of privacy law,
Warren and Brandeis. In The Right of Privacy, Warren and Brandeis
wrote that there were limits to an individual’s privacy.364 These
limitations on the right of privacy as described by Warren and
Brandeis remain an important aspect of privacy law and may
influence community property jurisdictions as to how far an intraspousal privacy right should cut into community property law.
Warren and Brandeis wrote that an individual’s privacy must yield to
matters of public importance, such as health, safety, and welfare.365
The invasion of a spouse’s privacy for the purposes of protecting the
safety of the other spouse or a child should thus be warranted.366 This
limitation should likely be interpreted beyond mere physical health,
safety, and welfare, to include economic safety and welfare. If a
spouse consents to her spouse searching through her private writings
or emails, that consent should negate any privacy claim asserted by
the consenting spouse, similar to how Warren and Brandeis argued
consent should generally preclude a privacy claim.
While the suggestions herein provide a way forward specifically
for community property jurisdictions, these solutions may also serve
as a starting point for privacy rights with regards to other forms of
jointly held property. Community property law provides no answer
for what rights of privacy two spouses have vis-à-vis one another with
regard to their jointly owned property, but co-ownership law similarly
has no answer to what rights of privacy co-owners have vis-à-vis one
another with regards to co-owned property. Community property is
one form of joint ownership, but it is not the only form. In all
situations in which individuals have concurrent property rights, the
issue of privacy can arise. Community property, as explored in this
Article, may provide a case study for the intersection of privacy and
other jointly held forms of property.

364. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214–18. See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing
the limits proposed by Warren and Brandeis).
365. E.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Ct. App. 1984).
366. E.g., State v. Poling, 938 N.E.2d 1118, 1124 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 2010).

